中国地区间税收竞争及其影响因素研究——来自动态空间杜宾模型的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 21-30.

中国地区间税收竞争及其影响因素研究——来自动态空间杜宾模型的经验证据

刘清杰¹, 任德孝², 刘倩¹

1.北京师范大学新兴市场研究院,北京 100875;
2.北京师范大学政府管理学院,北京 100875

收稿日期:2018-02-24 出版日期:2019-01-10 发布日期:2019-01-09
通讯作者: 任德孝(1988-),男,山东济宁人,北京师范大学政府管理学院博士,通讯作者
作者简介:刘清杰(1987-),女,河南洛阳人,北京师范大学新兴市场研究院博士后;刘倩(1984-),女,黑龙江哈尔滨人,北京师范大学新兴市场研究院副教授。
基金资助:
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2017M610781)

Research on Interregional Tax Competition and its Influencing Factors in China——Empirical Evidence from the Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model

LIU Qingjie¹, REN Dexiao², LIU Qian¹

1.Emerging Marjets Instiute, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;
2.School of Government, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China

Received:2018-02-24 Online:2019-01-10 Published:2019-01-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中国地区间以竞相税收优惠为竞争手段进行招商引资,制造税收“洼地”,影响公平竞争和市场统一。本文研究中国地区间税收竞争行为及其影响因素,基于不对称税收竞争理论,构建动态空间杜宾模型,提出并检验本文的理论假设。研究得出的主要结论如下:地理相邻的地区间税负具有正的空间相关性,并在多数地区间形成税负“逐底”的恶性竞争;经济相近的地区间税收竞争更激烈,阻碍资源有效整合;人口规模增长、工业化发展和对外开放水平的提高有助于促进地区保持高税负,缓解“逐底竞争”。为建设区域性中心城市在缓解竞争方面提供经验证据,中心城市带动地区人口流入、工业化发展和促进对外开放的同时,拉开地区经济发展层次,有利于税收竞争缓解和资源有效配置。

关键词: 税收竞争, 影响因素, 空间效应, 动态空间杜宾模型

Abstract: The motivation of regional tax preferential policies is to attract investment, which will lead to the formation of tax depression, and affecting fair competition and market unity. This paper studies the tax competition behavior and its influencing factors in China based on the theory of asymmetric tax competition. It puts forward a theoretical hypothesis and tests it by constructing a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model. Conclusions are as follows: The inter-regional tax burden has a positive spatial correlation, and forms a “vicious” tax competition; The regional tax competition is becoming more intense, and it is not easy to achieve effective regional integration;The increase of population scale, the development of industrialization and the improvement of the level of opening to the outside world help to motivate the region to maintain a high tax burden and ease the “down to bottom” of tax burden. This study also provides empirical evidence for the construction of regional key cities to ease competition. At the same time when the key cities drive the population inflow, industrialization development and opening to the outside world, the level of the regional economic development is conducive to the mitigation of tax competition and the effective allocation of resources.

Key words: Tax Competition, Influencing Factor, Spatial Effect, Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model

中图分类号:

F812.7

刘清杰, 任德孝, 刘倩. 中国地区间税收竞争及其影响因素研究——来自动态空间杜宾模型的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(1): 21-30.

LIU Qingjie, REN Dexiao, LIU Qian. Research on Interregional Tax Competition and its Influencing Factors in China——Empirical Evidence from the Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model[J]. , 2019, 35(1): 21-30.

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