高送转、公司业绩与高管减持规模

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9): 62-72.

高送转、公司业绩与高管减持规模

刘运, 叶德磊

华东师范大学经济与管理学部,上海 200241

收稿日期:2018-11-19 出版日期:2019-09-10 发布日期:2019-09-17
作者简介:刘运(1992-),女,江西泰和人,华东师范大学经济与管理学部博士生;叶德磊(1962-),男,江西永修人,华东师范大学经济与管理学部教授。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD016)

Large Stock Dividends,Company Performance and the Scale of Executive Stock Selling

LIU Yun, YE Delei

Faculty of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241,China

Received:2018-11-19 Online:2019-09-10 Published:2019-09-17

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 上市公司高送转和高管减持是资本市场关注的热点问题,被热炒的高送转题材更是一度成为高管减持公司的“标配”。选取2010~2017年间发生高管减持的中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高送转、公司业绩水平和高管减持规模之间的关系。结果表明,相较于未推出高送转的公司,推出高送转的公司高管减持规模更大;上市公司加大高送转强度会促使高管扩大减持规模;公司业绩与高管减持规模负相关,相对于业绩差的公司,业绩好的公司高管减持规模更小;进一步考察公司业绩在高送转行为与高管减持规模之间的调节作用后,发现随着公司业绩水平的提升,高送转与高管减持规模间的正向关系有所减弱。

关键词: 高送转, 高管减持规模, 公司业绩

Abstract: Large stock dividends and executive stock selling are hot issues in the capital market. The hot large stock dividends theme was once the standard for companies that have incurred executive stock selling. With China's A-share listed companies that have incurred executive stock selling from 2010 to 2017,as research samples, this paper empirically examines the relationship between large stock dividends,company performance and the scale of executive stock selling. The results show that executives of companies with large stock dividends have reduced their shares to a greater extent compared with those of the other companies. Decisions of the listed companies to increase their stock dividends will encourage their executives to expand their reduction. The company performance is negatively correlated with the scale of executive stock selling, and the better the company performance is, the smaller the scale the executive stock selling. Further study on the role of the company performance in adjusting the relationship between the behavior of large stock dividends and the scale of executive stock selling reveals that with the improvement of the company performance,the positive relationship between large stock dividends and the scale of executive stock selling will be weakened.

Key words: Large Stock Dividends, the Scale of Executive Stock Selling, Company Performance

中图分类号:

F275

刘运, 叶德磊. 高送转、公司业绩与高管减持规模[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(9): 62-72.

LIU Yun, YE Delei. Large Stock Dividends,Company Performance and the Scale of Executive Stock Selling[J]. , 2019, 35(9): 62-72.

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