关键词: 高管权力, 机构投资者, 并购绩效, 国有企业

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between executive power, institutional investors and M & A performance by taking 1879 samples of M & A transactions in China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016. The research results are as follows: (1)Executive power has a significant negative impacton M&A performance.which is more conspicuousin state-owned enterprises. (2)Institutional investors' shareholdings have a positive impact on M&A performance. The role of institutional investors is to suppress the negative impact of executive power on M&A performance. This inhibition effect is weak in the samples of SOEs, but prominent in the samples of non-state enterprises especially when the institutional investors have a certain proportion of shares. (3)Further research based on the type of mergers and acquisitions finds that institutional investors have more significant effects on the regulation of executive power and M&A performance in off-site mergers and acquisitions; When the party concerned is a central state-owned enterprise, the adjustment effect is more significant, and the regulatory role of institutional investors in non-state-owned enterprises is not significantly different. The conclusions of the study provide a basis for rationally restricting the power of executives and highlight the need for state-owned enterprises to actively introduce institutional investors to implement the mixed ownership reform.

Key words: Executive Authority, Institutional Investors, M & A Performance, State-owned Enterprises