Abstract: We apply the pooled sample and propensity score matching sample to examine the change of fund which was occupied by the block shareholder around the disclosure of internal control weaknesses,we found that prior to the disclosure,the internal control can constrain the appropriation and the effect disappeared until the second year after the disclosure.we provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of internal control and the tunneling behavior of block shareholder,and shed light on the debate regarding the costs and benefits of the section 2008.

摘要： 本文分别采用混合样本和PSM配对样本，通过研究2009年—2013年间上市公司内部控制缺陷披露前后的大股东资金占用情况，揭示内部控制对大股东掏空行为的影响，研究发现内部控制水平能够显著抑制大股东的掏空行为，抑制效应一直持续到内控缺陷披露之后的第二年才衰减消失，但对大股东权力强度的抑制效应并不明显，研究结论为两者之间存在的因果关系提供更直接的证据，也为化解有关内部控制制度的“效益与成本”之争提供证据支持。