Abstract: The food safety issues are frequent emergence because the quality is difficult to be observed and detected. In order to solve the problem, it is necessary to design the market competition environment which is encouraging manufacturers to expose the illegal behavior in the production of toxic food. By developing incentive compatibility model, food safety issues are analyzed under the market structure of Cournot competition, Stackelberg competition, the price leader model and differential competition. These studies show that the price competition is more beneficial to improve food safety than Cournot Competition. When the level of product differentiation is high, the price competition is more conducive to improve food safety. Consumer demand elasticity only plays a role in price competition.

摘要： 食品质量难以被检测导致了食品安全问题频繁出现。为了解决这一问题，需要设计一种市场竞争环境，激励厂商揭发制造有毒食品的行为。通过数字例子对古诺竞争、斯坦克博格竞争、价格领导者竞争及差异化竞争等，厂商模仿或揭发激励相容条件的对比分析，得出产量竞争相对于价格竞争，在提高市场集中度时更能有效的提高食品安全。产品差异化水平较高时，价格竞争更有利于提高食品安全。需求弹性只有在价格竞争时才发挥作用。