Abstract: At present, the capital regulation based on the Basel agreement has already become the Bible in the commercial banks globally. It is common that any decisions should supervised by the capital regulation. This paper provides a new perspective of commercial banks' risk-taking behavior which subdivided into the risky incentive, risky strategy and risk consequence. Meanwhile, we put the Chinese commercial banks under this framework and do some empirical tests. The conclusion is that capital regulation has different effects on the risk taking behavior which makes the policy more targeted.

摘要： 当前，以巴塞尔协议为范本进行推广的资本监管，已经成为全球商业银行的统一的“紧箍咒”。商业银行的任何行为决策必须在资本监管规范下进行，已经逐渐成为常态。本文以上述问题为起点，通过新的视角建立资本监管与商业银行风险承担动机、风险承担决策和风险承担后果的理论框架，并以中国97家商业银行2003——2013年数据为样本建立SD资本风险内生模型，实证结果显示该研究框架能够更加精确地探索资本监管对于商业银行风险承担行为的影响路径。其中，资本充足率监管承担了约束商业银行风险承担动机和优化风险承担决策的政策功能，核心一级资本充足率和杠杆率监管有效预防了风险承担后果。该结论突破了以往将资本监管对商业银行风险承担行为的影响简单概括为有效或者无效，从而使得政策启示更加具有针对性。