Abstract:

The governance division in public affairs in China not only refer to the principle of efficiency, but also consider the political risk factors. Based on this logic, we construct a game model in this paper to analysis the mechanism of environmental governance power division, we found that different environment governance division differences. Specific to the EIA approval powers, the degree of decentralization is directly influenced by the local science and technology level. Therefore, this paper constructs a provincial panel data for empirical test, the results show that the progress of science and technology will promote the central decentralization of the EIA approval power, which is also in line with the reform process of the EIA approval system in our country. In addition, we also find that the central government can not only reduce the political risk through environmental system reform, but also can adjust the incentive mechanism to guide the local government to protect environment.

摘要：

我国政府在公共事务事权划分时不仅参照效率原则，而且考虑政治风险因素。基于此逻辑，本文构建博弈模型分析了央地环境治理事权划分内在机制，发现环境治理不同事权划分存在差异。具体到环评审批事权，其分权程度受地方科技水平的直接影响，本文为此构建了省级面板数据进行实证检验，结果表明科技进步会促使中央下放环评审批事权，这也符合我国环评审批制度的改革历程。此外，本文还认为中央政府不仅可以通过环境体制改革以降低政治风险，而且可以调整激励机制以引导地方政府进行环境保护。