Abstract:

Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China for the period 2007—2014，this paper investigates the relationship between government subsidy and stock price crash risk from the perspective of rent-seeking,so as to provide new empirical evidence to clarify the economic consequences of fiscal subsidies.We find that government subsidy is positively associated with stock price crash risk. Results show that the impact of government subsidy is more pronounced in firms located in regions with low institutional environment and industry supported by government industrial policy.The further analyses indicate that rent-seeking do affect this positive realtionship. According to the rent-seeking theory, the executives can “disguise” the accounting performance and hide bad news of firm by the government subsidy,Our paper contributes to the growing literature on internal control and tunneling．It also offers useful implications to government that are seeking to evaluate the impact of government subsidy policy and promote the capital market in China.

摘要：

本文以中国A股市场2007－2014年上市公司的数据为样本，基于企业寻租理论的视角，实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响，旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现：（1）政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系；（2）在制度环境水平较低的地区，政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强；（3）在产业政策支持的行业，政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强；（4）进一步分析表明，企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明，管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。本文研究结论对政府部门客观评价政府补贴的效果和促进资本市场平稳发展具有重要的现实意义和借鉴意义。