›› 2016, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (8): 105-112.

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Executive Incentives,Environmental Regulation and Technological Innovation

  

  • Received:2016-03-16 Revised:2016-05-13 Online:2016-08-10 Published:2016-09-20

高管激励、环境规制与技术创新

于金,李楠   

  1. 河海大学
  • 通讯作者: 李楠

Abstract:

Abstract: Using 2007-2014 Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed company of heavily polluting industries and the study sample, This paper elaborates a interactive model , and it tests the impact of environmental regulation on the technological innovation , it also tests the impact on technological innovation from interactive effects between the environmental regulation and the related factors of the executive Incentives. The study shows that the environmental regulation positively contributes to technological innovation improvement, but the effect is not noticeable in the state-owned enterprises and Non-eastern area enterprises. So the establishment of Porter Hypothesis requires certain conditions. In addition, executive salary and executive share proportion both have positive adjust action in environmental regulation and technological innovation, while perquisite consumption could enhance the effectiveness of Porter Hypothesis only in eastern area businesses.

摘要:

摘要:以2007-2014年重污染行业沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,构建交互效应模型,实证检验了环境规制对技术创新的影响,以及高管激励与环境规制交互效应对技术创新的影响。研究结果发现环境规制对技术创新有显著的促进作用,但是这种促进作用在国有企业以及非东部地区企业中并不明显,表明波特假说的成立有一定的条件。其次,高管短期薪酬和高管持股比例均对环境规制和技术创新起到正向调节作用。而高管在职消费仅在东部地区企业中增强波特假说的有效性。

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