Abstract: The political connection of managers can not only strengthen their competitive advantage but also weaken the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. From the perspective of irregularities and the managers' turnover, this paper uses both the Bivariate Probit model and the mediating effect model to study how the political connection of managers affect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. The results are as follows: Those companies whose managers have political connections are more inclined to commit violations, which is especially true with private enterprises; Political connections of managers can help to reduce the likelihood of investigations into the companies' violations, which is especially true with the state-owned enterprises; The political connection helps the manager to establish the position trenches and reduce the probability that the manager is forced to leave. However, after the enterprise's illegal behavior is inspected, the probability of manager's turnover will be significantly improved. The results also prove that the political association of the managers weakens the pre-regulation of the enterprise's irregularities, but the audit of the enterprise's irregularities has significant governance effect in ex-post supervision.

Key words: Political Connection, Corporate Irregularities, Manager Turnover, Bivariate Probit Model

摘要： 管理者政治关联在强化企业竞争优势的同时,也会弱化公司治理机制的有效性。本文基于公司违规行为发生及管理者被迫离职两个方面,利用Bivariate Probit模型和Logit模型研究管理者政治关联对公司治理有效性的影响。研究发现,拥有政治关联的管理者所在企业更加倾向发生违规行为,尤其是民营企业;管理者的政治关联能够降低其违规行为被稽查处理的可能性,尤其是国有企业。政治关联有助于管理者建立职位壕沟,降低管理者被迫离职的概率;而企业违规行为被稽查后,管理者被迫离职的可能性将显著提高。文章的研究结果证明,管理者政治关联会弱化企业发生违规行为的事前监管,同时也会降低企业违规行为的稽查在事后监管中的公司治理效果。

关键词: 政治关联, 企业违规, 管理者被迫离职, Bivariate Probit模型