Abstract: In order to further study the effectiveness of the NEEQ market, this paper analyzes the efficiency and risk of corporate financing behavior by using the panel data from 2011 to 2015. The results show that the private placement and equity pledge does more harm than good to enterprises' economic efficiency, and the private placement in particular reduces the economic efficiency of the enterprise. For the risk derived from the financing behavior, the equity pledge behavior is more likely to generate operational financial risk. For the demand side of the capital, the enterprise should improve the current situation by means of the beforehand financing preparations, improving corporate governance structure, and correcting the concept of financing; For the supply side, the supply system should be differentiated to increase the effective information of the market, improve the market liquidity, and gradually improve the quality of enterprise financing. Finally, a targeted financing supervision system is an important guarantee to ensure the orderly operation of the NEEQ market.

Key words: NEEQ, Financing Efficiency, Risk Derivation, Corrective Mechanism

摘要： 为了深入研究新三板市场的有效程度,本文选取新三板企业2011年至2015年的面板数据,检验分析企业融资行为的效率和风险问题。研究表明:企业的定向增发和股权质押行为对企业经济效率而言弊大于利,特别的,定向增发更为明显地减损了企业的经济效率;对于融资行为所衍生的风险而言,股权质押行为更有可能衍生出经营财务风险。基于此,从资金需求端看,企业自身应当从融资事前准备、完善企业治理结构、端正融资观念入手来改善当前的境况;从资金供给端看,应通过差异化的制度供给来增加市场的有效信息含量,提高市场流动性,并逐步提高企业融资质量。在此基础上,建立一个有针对性的融资监管体系是新三板市场有序运行的重要保障。

关键词: 新三板, 融资效率, 风险衍生, 纠正机制