The Sources of Family Business CEOs,Risk-taking and Economic Consequences

Abstract

Abstract: With the aging of the family business entrepreneurs, the successor choice has become one of the major obstacles in the development of family business. This paper divides the family business CEOs into three categories, the founder CEO, the successor CEO and the professional manager CEO. We test the impact of different sources of CEOs on corporate risk-taking, as well as the economic consequences. It's found that the family founder CEO and the family successor CEO will significantly reduce the risk of family business commitment level, and this inhibition effect in the family successor as CEO is more obvious. Professional manager CEOs will significantly improve the level of risk borne by the family business. Further examination of the economic consequences of risk-taking finds that family business risk-taking behavior can significantly enhance the value of the enterprise, and this effect will not change with the change of the CEO source The results of this study provide a new reference standard for the successor choice of family business in our country and is conducive to the solution of the inheritance problem faced by family enterprises in china. Besides, it also provides some reference for the venture investment of family business.

Key words: Family Business, the Source of CEO, Risk-taking, Economic Consequences

摘要： 随着家族企业创业者年龄的增长,继任人选择已经成为影响家族企业发展的一大障碍。本文将家族企业CEO来源分成创始人CEO、继任者CEO和职业经理人CEO三个类别,检验了不同来源CEO对企业风险承担及其经济后果的影响。研究发现,家族创始人CEO和家族继任者CEO降低了家族企业的风险承担水平,并且这种抑制效应在家族继任者担任CEO时更为明显,而职业经理人CEO会提高家族企业的风险承担水平。进一步检验风险承担的经济后果发现,家族企业风险承担行为能够提高企业价值,并且这种提升效应不会因CEO来源的改变而发生改变。本文研究结论为我国家族企业继任者选择提供了新的参考标准,有利于解决我国家族企业的传承难题,也为家族企业的风险投资提供一定的参考。

关键词: 家族企业, CEO来源, 风险承担, 经济后果

CLC Number:

F272

WANG Xiangyao, CHI Dianzhou, JIN Yihe. The Sources of Family Business CEOs,Risk-taking and Economic Consequences[J]. , 2017, 33(11): 74-83.

汪祥耀, 迟殿洲, 金一禾. 家族企业CEO来源、风险承担及经济后果[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(11): 74-83.

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