How Does the Internal and External Governance Mechanisms Affect the Executive-Employee Pay Dispersion?

Abstract

Abstract:

From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the effects of internal and external governance mechanism on the pay dispersion. The results are as follows: (1) Based on thr full sample study, it's found that the ratio of independent directors and dual are positively correlated with executive-employee pay dispersion, whereas the first shareholder proportion, size of the board directors and the supervisors are negatively correlated with it; a fiercer product market competition helps to reduce the executive-employee pay dispersion,whereas those external policy supervisions are positively related to the pay dispersion; (2) Based on the property nature study, it's found dual and an increasing size of board directors can lead to widening of executive-employee pay dispersion in private firms, whereas they have no obvious effect in state-owned firms, central firms and non-central firms; (3) Based on the interval effect of executive-employee pay dispersion study, it's discovered that a part of internal governance mechanisms in full sample, private firms, non-central firms can be affected by pay dispersion interval effect and then play different roles, whereas product market competition and control policy factors can inhibit and increase pay dispersion respectively. In a word, this paper helps to clarify the role of different governance mechanisms on executive-employee pay dispersion, pointing out the direction of how to alleviate this internal contradiction of compensation.

Key words: Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, Executive-Employee Pay Dispersion, Control Policy

摘要：

本文从公司治理角度出发实证检验公司内外治理机制对高管-员工薪酬差距的影响,得到以下研究结论:(1)基于全样本的研究发现:公司内部独立董事比例和两职兼任与高管-员工薪酬差距正相关,第一大股东持股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模等与薪酬差距负相关;公司外部产品市场竞争与薪酬差距负相关,“限薪令”、“八项规定”等管制政策因素与薪酬差距正相关。(2)基于产权性质差异的研究发现:两职兼任与董事会规模扩大会进一步拉开民营企业的高管-员工薪酬差距,但对国有企业、中央企业、非中央企业的高管-员工薪酬差距并无明显作用。(3)基于高管-员工薪酬差距区间效应的研究发现:在全样本、民营企业、非中央企业三个样本中,公司内部部分治理机制会受薪酬差距区间效应的影响而发挥不同的治理作用,但产品市场竞争和管制政策因素始终分别发挥着缩小和扩大薪酬差距的作用。本文结论厘清了公司内外治理机制影响高管-员工薪酬差距的作用方向,能够为企业如何缓解内部薪酬矛盾提供一定的借鉴参考。

关键词: 公司治理, 产品市场竞争, 高管-员工薪酬差距, 管制政策

CLC Number:

F270

CHEN Xiaoshan. How Does the Internal and External Governance Mechanisms Affect the Executive-Employee Pay Dispersion?[J]. .

陈晓珊. 上市公司内外治理机制如何影响高管-员工薪酬差距？[J]. 财经论丛.

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