VC's Heterogeneities, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Earnings Management Pre-IPO

Abstract

Abstract:

Based on the empirical data of 202 SME companies backed by venture capital from 2008 to 2014, this paper studies how the VC's participation in corporate governance affects the companies' earnings management pre-IPO. It shows that the ratio of VC's ownership and the proportion of directors appointed by VC institutions have no obvious effect on the earnings management pre-IPO, but the ratio of professional directors appointed by VC institutions has a significantly negative correlation with the earnings management pre-IPO. This paper further distinguishes the different backgrounds of venture capital and finds that VC backed by government could restrain companies' earnings management pre-IPO by participating in corporate governance,but the independent and corporate backed VCs have no obvious impact on the earnings management pre-IPO.Based on the analysis above,this paper concludes that although VC has become an ordinary mechanism of external governance, its governance capability and effect is restricted by different institutional environment. The conclusion of the study provides empirical evidence for the further improvement of VC's environment.

Key words: Venture Capital, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Heterogeneities of VCs' background, Earnings Management Pre-IPO

摘要：

本文以2008~2014年在深圳中小板上市的202家有风险投资参与的IPO公司为研究样本,考察风险投资参与公司治理及其背景异质性对被投资企业IPO前盈余管理的影响。实证检验表明,风险投资机构持股比例及向企业派出董事比例对风险企业IPO前盈余管理无显著影响,但是向风险企业派出专业董事比例与IPO前盈余管理显著负相关。进一步区分不同背景风险投资的研究发现,政府背景风险投资向企业派出董事、专业董事及其持股比例有助于减轻企业IPO前盈余管理程度,但是上述研究结果并未出现在独立背景风险投资和企业背景风险投资中。尽管风险投资普遍成为一种外部治理机制,但是其治理能力和效果却受到不同制度环境的制约与影响,这为进一步完善风险投资环境提供了经验证据。

关键词: 风险投资, 公司治理机制, 背景异质性, IPO前盈余管理

CLC Number:

F239.65

XU Hong, LIN Zhonggao, ZHU Yaping. VC's Heterogeneities, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Earnings Management Pre-IPO[J]. .

徐虹,林钟高,朱雅萍. 风险投资异质性、公司治理机制与企业IPO前盈余管理[J]. 财经论丛.

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