›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (2): 58-68.

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Stock Mispricing,Managerial Shareholdings and Firms' R&D Investment ——Empirical Evidence from China's High-Tech Listed Firms

HU Guoqiang, XIAO Zhichao   

  1. Business School,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China
  • Received:2017-06-09 Online:2018-02-10 Published:2018-02-10

股票误定价、管理层持股与企业R&D投资——基于我国高新技术上市公司的经验证据

胡国强, 肖志超   

  1. 天津财经大学商学院,天津 300222
  • 作者简介:胡国强(1985-),男,江西抚州人,天津财经大学商学院讲师,博士;肖志超(1989-),男,河北邢台人,天津财经大学商学院博士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502122);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC630048);天津财经大学优秀青年学者计划(YQ1503)

Abstract: Using a sample of high-tech listed firms during 2007~2015,this paper investigates the impact of managerial shareholdings on the sensitivity of firms' R&D investment to stock mispricing,and subsequent insider trading and R&D performance. We find that managerial shareholdings cause exacerbating effect by increasing the positive impact of stock over-mispricing on R&D investment. However,managerial shareholdings play governance effect by partly reducing the negative link of stock under-mispricing to R&D investment. It is further found that the level of stock over-mispricing significantly increases the size of selling shares held by managers of over-mispriced firms,and over-mispriced firms have weaker R&D performance.

Key words: Managerial Shareholdings, Stock Mispricing, R&D Investment, Catering, Managers' Self-Interest

摘要: 本文以2007~2015年A股高新技术上市公司样本,考察管理层持股在股票误定价影响企业R&D投资中的作用效应,以及其中的内部人交易与研发绩效。研究发现:管理层持股加剧了股票高估对R&D投资的正向影响,在股票高估引致的R&D投资中产生“恶化效应”,但同时却一定程度有助于缓解股票低估对R&D投资的负向影响,发挥“治理效应”。进一步集中于股票高估公司发现:股票高估程度越大,持股管理层出售持股规模越大,且高估公司随后研发绩效更差。

关键词: 管理层持股, 股票误定价, R&D投资, 迎合理论, 管理层自利

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