CEO Power Intensity,Equity Incentive Plan and CEO Explicit Corruption

Abstract

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between stock incentive plan and CEO explicit corruption in the view of CEO power. The data are based on CEO corruption cases of China's companies from 2006～2015.The empirical results show that: (1) The worse CEO power, the higher the probability of CEO rent-seeking and agency costs. (2) Equity incentive plan of China, can't effectively coordinatethe relationship between CEO power and CEO explicit corruption. In particular, stock incentive plan of state-owned companies has increased the probability of CEO corruption.(3) The lower the monetary remuneration & the longer the incentive period, the higher the probability of CEO explicit corruption. These conclusions are helpful to improve the design of equity incentive plan, optimize corporate governance, supervise and restrain CEO power, and provide policy reference for SRC and SAMC.

Key words: CEO Explicit Corruption, CEO Power Intensity, Equity Incentive Plan

摘要： 文章以2006～2015年我国上市公司高管腐败案件为对象,从高管权力强度视角考察股权激励与高管显性腐败之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)高管权力越大,其发生权力寻租行为的概率越大,同时代理成本也越高;(2)我国上市公司的股权激励计划,未能有效调节企业高管权力强度与高管显性腐败之间的关系,尤其是国有控股上市公司实施的股权激励计划,反而加大了高管腐败发生概率;(3)货币薪酬越少、激励有效期越长,发生高管腐败行为概率越高。这些结论对公司决策层完善股权激励计划设计、优化公司治理、监督和约束高管权力具有参考意义,也能为证监会、国资委制定政策提供借鉴。

关键词: 高管显性腐败, 高管权力强度, 股权激励

CLC Number:

F276.6

LIU Guangjun, PENG Shaobing. CEO Power Intensity,Equity Incentive Plan and CEO Explicit Corruption[J]. , 2018, 34(6): 87-95.

刘光军, 彭韶兵. 高管权力强度、股权激励与高管显性腐败[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(6): 87-95.

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