Abstract: Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2016,this paper examines whether and how the behavior of managerial entrenchment affects the value of cash holdings. The results of the research are as follows: In cash holdings behaviors of Chinese listed companies, agency problems caused by managerial entrenchment are common occurrences,and the opportunistic behavior of managerial entrenchment significantly reduces the value of corporate cash holdings;the correlation for SOEs is more significant than that for private companies. Further research shows that executives' promotion mechanism has a significantly positive incentive for senior executives,which can effectively restrict the opportunistic behavior of managerial entrenchment to damage the value of cash holdings,and the incentive effect is more significant in SOEs than that in private companies. This paper provides empirical evidence for the use of promotion incentive to effectively alleviate the agency problems caused by managerial entrenchment.

Key words: Managerial Entrenchment, Promotion Incentive, Value of Cash Holdings

摘要： 文章选择2004~2016年中国沪、深两市的公司数据,就管理层防御行为对公司现金持有价值的效应进行实证分析。结果发现,在现金持有行为中,中国上市公司普遍存在因管理防御而产生的代理问题,并且管理层防御程度越高,企业持有现金的价值越低;与民营企业相比,国有企业的经营者管理防御行为对公司现金持有价值的损害更为显著。进一步研究表明,晋升机制对公司高管具有显著的正面激励效应,能有效制约经营者管理防御的机会主义行为损害公司持有现金的价值,同民营企业相比,晋升机制对国有企业高管的激励效果更为显著。本文为晋升激励有效缓解管理防御代理问题提供了经验证据。

关键词: 管理防御, 晋升激励, 现金持有价值