Stock Option Incentive,Debt Contract and the Choice of theInvestment Real Estate Measurement Model

›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (12): 74-83.

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Stock Option Incentive,Debt Contract and the Choice of theInvestment Real Estate Measurement Model

WANG Ye¹, SUN Huiqian¹, WANG Ningning²

1.School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;
2.School of Accounting,Wuxi Taihu College,Wuxi 214064,China

Received:2018-02-08 Online:2018-12-10 Published:2018-12-05

股票期权激励、债务契约与投资性房地产计量模式选择

王烨¹,孙慧倩¹,王宁宁²

1.南京审计大学会计学院,江苏南京 211815;
2.无锡太湖学院会计学院,江苏无锡 214064

作者简介:王烨(1970-),男,安徽滁州人,南京审计大学会计学院教授,博士;孙慧倩(1975-),女,安徽蚌埠人,南京审计大学会计学院讲师,博士;王宁宁(1991-),女,江苏徐州人,无锡太湖学院会计学院助教。
基金资助:
江苏省社会科学基金项目(18GLB004);江苏省高校品牌专业建设工程资助项目(PPZY2015A075);江苏省高校人文社会科学校外研究基地“苏南资本市场研究中心”(2017ZSJD020)

Abstract

Abstract: Using samples of listed companies in China's Non-financial insurance industry with real estate investment in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2016,this paper studies the influence of motivation of stock option incentive and debt contract on the choice of fair value measurement model of real estate investment. The findings are as follows:The companies which implement stock option incentive plans are more likely to adopt a fair value model for real estate investment than those which do not implement stock option incentive. The higher the debt level of the company,the greater the probability for the fair value model to be used in the subsequent measurement of the real estate investment. Further analysis show that the motivation of stock option incentive and debt contract have an interaction effect on the choice of fair value measurement model of real estate investment,and the implementation of stock option incentive will strengthen the positive relationship between the choice of fair value measurement model of real estate investment and the motivation of debt covenants. These results indicate that it is very important to strengthen audit supervision and optimize the formulation and implementation of the stock option incentive and the debt contract for the improvement of the investment real estate fair value accounting information quality.

Key words: Investment Real Estate, Stock Option Incentive, Debt Contract, Fair Value

摘要： 本文以我国沪深两市2007~2016年间持有投资性房地产的非金融保险行业上市公司为对象,研究了股票期权激励与债务契约动因对投资性房地产公允价值计量模式选择的影响。研究发现,与未实施股票期权激励计划的公司相比较,实施股票期权激励的公司更可能对投资性房地产采用公允价值模式进行后续计量;公司对投资性房地产后续计量选择公允价值模式的概率,随债务水平的增高而增大;进一步分析发现,股票期权激励与债务契约动因对投资性房地产公允价值后续计量模式的选择存在交乘效应影响,实施股票期权激励会强化债务契约动因与投资性房地产公允价值后续计量模式选择之间的正相关关系。结果表明,强化审计监督,优化股票期权激励和债务契约的制定与执行,对于投资性房地产公允价值会计信息质量的提高具有非常重要意义。

关键词: 投资性房地产, 股票期权激励, 债务契约, 公允价值

CLC Number:

F270

WANG Ye, SUN Huiqian, WANG Ningning. Stock Option Incentive,Debt Contract and the Choice of theInvestment Real Estate Measurement Model[J]. , 2018, 34(12): 74-83.

王烨,孙慧倩,王宁宁. 股票期权激励、债务契约与投资性房地产计量模式选择[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(12): 74-83.

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Stock Option Incentive,Debt Contract and the Choice of theInvestment Real Estate Measurement Model

股票期权激励、债务契约与投资性房地产计量模式选择

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