Abstract: Refusal to Licensing is a controversial issue in antimonopoly law legislation and enforcement. This paper concentrates on clarifying strategic motivies and competition effects of refusal to Licensing. The results demonstrate that the specialist patent holder has no incentives to refuse licensing. When the implimenter has the ability to enter patent market by follow-on innovation, the specialist patent holder has stronger incentives to refuse licensing in order to foreclose potential competitors. In this scenario, refusal to licensing impedes innovation and harms dynamic efficiency, which should be prohibited by Antimonopoly law. The antimonopoly review of refusal to licensing by patent holder whose patent constitutes essential facility should pay much attention to innovation effects by applying innovative market foreclosure theory.

Key words: Spacialist Patentee, Refusal to Licensing, Strategic Motives, Competition Effects, Antimonopoly

摘要： 本文重点解释专业研发企业拒绝许可的策略动机及其竞争效应。研究结论显示，专业研发企业通常并不具有实施拒绝许可的激励，只有当下游企业具备通过基于原始专利的二次创新并进入专利技术市场的能力时，专利持有企业才具有通过拒绝许可来排斥潜在竞争者的激励。此时，拒绝许可严重伤害技术创新和动态效率，应受到反垄断法的禁止。对构成必要设施专利持有人拒绝许可的反垄断审查应重点关注创新阻碍效应,依据“创新性市场封锁理论”进行反垄断审查。

关键词: 专业研发企业, 拒绝许可, 策略激励, 竞争效应, 反垄断政策