›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 71-80.

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Stockholders' Pledge of Stock Right and Internal Control Quality

FU Yuyuan, YUAN Zeming, LI Tian   

  1. School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
  • Received:2018-06-11 Online:2019-01-10 Published:2019-01-09

大股东股权质押与企业内部控制

富钰媛, 苑泽明, 李田   

  1. 天津财经大学商学院,天津 300222
  • 作者简介:富钰媛(1988-),女,河北承德人,天津财经大学商学院博士生;苑泽明(1964-),女,天津市人,天津财经大学商学院教授,博士生导师;李田(1989-),女,天津市人,天津财经大学商学院博士生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AJY004)

Abstract:

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016, this paper empirically examines the effect of shareholders' pledge of their shares on the internal control. The result are as follows: The share pledge is negatively correlated with the internal control; The higher the proportion of the share pledge and the more frequent the shares pledge, the lower the quality of the internal control. The negative impact of the share pledge on internal control exists only in the sample group with a low level of incestor protection. This paper enriches the study on the economic consequences of share pledge and expands the research on the influencing factors of internal control.

Key words: Stockholders' Pledge of Stock Right, Internal Control Quality, PSM

摘要:

本文以2009~2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,运用倾向匹配得分法研究了大股东股权质押对公司内部控制的影响,结果显示:大股东股权质押对内部控制产生负面影响,且程度随质押比重与频次的增加而愈发严重;相较于投资者保护程度较高的样本组,大股东股权质押对内部控制的负向影响只存在于投资者保护程度较低组。本文丰富了大股东股权质押的经济后果及内控影响因素的理论研究,并从加强投资者保护的角度对如何降低其对内部控制的影响进行了深入讨论。

关键词: 大股东股权质押, 内部控制, 倾向匹配得分法

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