Abstract: In the field of corporate governance, there is a lack of in-depth research on the influencing mechanism of directors' professional expertise. This paper introduces a new feature of directors ——audit industry expertise to investigate the effect of directors with audit background on companies’ underinvestment and its economic consequence. The findings of the study are as follows: the directors with audit background do have an influence on companies’ underinvestment. Compared with independent directors, the internal directors with audit background have more significant impact on the underinvestment. When the directors with audit background are also member of the Strategic Investment Committee of the company, their negative effect on the underinvestment increases. Further studies find that although the prudent mindset of directors with audit background has increased the underinvestment of enterprise, it does not reduce their long-term performance.That is to say, the investment decisions made by such directors may not necessarily be “Non-Action”, but may also be the reflection of their audit “prudent” mindset.

Key words: Directors with Audit Background, Underinvestment, Strategic Investment Committee, Long-term Performance

摘要： 本文针对董事执业专长影响公司治理的作用机制研究欠深入的现状,考察了董事审计背景对投资不足的影响及其经济后果。研究发现:具有审计背景特征的董事会影响企业投资不足;审计背景内部董事对投资不足的影响更大;当审计背景董事兼任公司战略投资委员会成员时,投资不足更多;审计背景董事具有的审慎思维虽加大了企业的投资不足,却并未降低其长期绩效,即该类董事在投资决策中不一定是“不作为”,也可能是审计“审慎”思维的深度反应。

关键词: 审计背景董事, 投资不足, 战略投资委员会, 长期绩效