The Optimization of Basic Public Goods Supply Mode:An Analysis Based on VCM Experiments

Abstract

Abstract: The COVID-19 epidemic aggravates the risk of economic recession and severely tests the positive financial sustainability. It needs to optimize the supply mode of basic public goods, integrate public choices through administrative coordination, improve financial revenue and expenditure, and strengthen grass-roots governance and social security. VCM experiments show that behavior interference, objective altruism, communication effect, inertia, period effect, bounded rationality and trust cooperation have a positive effect on the voluntary supply rate of basic public goods. Active free riding, passive loss avoidance, compromise, cheat, tit-for-tat internal punishment, wait-and-see and expectation have a negative effect in turn. Local governments can refine the system design according to residents' decision-making logic, issue municipal bonds or set up guiding funds, shorten subscription or investment periods, advocate community information sharing, establish the long-term mechanism of combining residents' self-help and government supply, and promote the efficiency and equalization of basic public services.

Key words: Basic Public Goods Supply, Mode Optimization, Grass-roots Governance, Social Security, VCM Experiments

摘要： 新冠肺炎疫情加剧经济衰退风险,严峻考验积极财政政策可持续性,需要优化基层公共品供给模式,行政统筹融合公共选择,改善财政收支状况,加强和完善基层治理与社会保障体系建设。VCM实验显示,对于基层公共品自愿供给率,行为干扰、客观利他、沟通效应、惯性、期数效应、有限理性与信任合作具有依次增强的正向作用;主动搭便车、被动避免损失、折中、欺诈、针锋相对式内部惩罚、观望和预期具有依次减弱的负向作用。地方财政可根据居民决策逻辑,细化制度设计,发行专项公债,设立引导基金,缩短认购投资期限,倡导社区信息共享,建立健全群众自助与政府供应相结合的长效机制,促进基本公共服务效率化均等化。

关键词: 公共品供给, 模式优化, 基层治理, 社会保障, VCM实验

CLC Number:

F812

DENG Xiaolan, SUN Changpeng. The Optimization of Basic Public Goods Supply Mode:An Analysis Based on VCM Experiments[J]. , 2020, 36(8): 32-41.

邓晓兰, 孙长鹏. 基层公共品供给模式优化路径:基于VCM实验的分析[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(8): 32-41.

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