Corporate Strategic Difference,Executive Compensation Incentive and Auditor Choice

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper examines the relationship among corporate strategic differences,executive compensation incentives and auditor selection. The results of the study are as follows: When the company's strategy deviates from the industry's routine,the more enterprises prefer to choose high-quality auditors, the greater the executive compensation incentive intensity is,the more the inclined the enterprise is to choose high-quality auditors; Executive compensation incentive will enhance the positive correlation between corporate strategic differences and auditor selection. The conclusion of this paper enriches the academic literature of corporate strategic positioning and auditor selection,and has certain enlightenment significance for corporate strategic management and compensation management.

Key words: Differentiation Strategy, Executive Compensation Incentive, Auditor Selection

摘要： 本文以2007~2016年沪深A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了企业战略差异、高管薪酬激励与审计师选择之间的关系。研究发现,当公司战略偏离行业常规程度越大时,企业越偏向于选择高质量审计;当高管薪酬激励强度越大时,企业越偏向于选择高质量审计;高管薪酬激励会增强企业战略差异度与审计师选择之间的正相关关系。本文的研究结论丰富了企业战略定位与审计师选择的学术文献,并对企业战略管理和薪酬管理具有一定的启示意义。

关键词: 差异化战略, 高管薪酬激励, 审计师选择

CLC Number:

F239.0

LI Guowei, SHEN Xiaoyan. Corporate Strategic Difference,Executive Compensation Incentive and Auditor Choice[J]. , 2020, 36(12): 70-77.

厉国威, 沈晓艳. 企业战略差异、高管薪酬激励与审计师选择[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(12): 70-77.

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