The Impact of Sub-provincial Fiscal Decentralization and Promotion Competition on Environmental Quality: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

Abstract: This paper constructs a multidimensional promotion incentives intergovernmental competition model with the introduction of the environmental quality to explain the formation of China's environmental degradation. Using China's river water quality monitoring panel data and municipal-level panel data, it analyzes the impact of Sub-provincial fiscal decentralization and promotion competition on the environmental quality. The findings are as follows: (1) The increase of Sub-provincial fiscal revenue decentralization and promotion will reduce local government's environmental protection expenditure and environmental supervision, and reduce the environmental quality. (2) The two mechanisms on the expansion effect can substitute. (3) The impact of sub-provincial fiscal expenditure decentralization is uncertain.

Key words: Sub-provincial, Fiscal Decentralization, Promotion Competition, Environmental Quality

摘要： 基于中国经济持续高速增长和环境污染恶化并存的现象,本文构建了引入环境质量因素的多维晋升激励政府间竞争模型,解释中国环境质量下降的形成机制。本文利用2004~2010年河流水质监测面板数据,匹配地级市面板数据,运用系统GMM方法实证检验了省以下财政分权与地方官员晋升竞争两种形成机制。结果表明,省以下财政收入分权程度、地方官员晋升竞争力上升,促使地方政府降低环境保护支出和环境监管力度,增加污染物排放,降低地方环境质量。两种机制对环境质量下降的扩张效应具有替代效应,省以下财政支出分权程度对环境质量的影响则不确定。

关键词: 省以下, 财政分权, 晋升竞争, 环境质量

CLC Number:

F812.7

LU Weijun, LUO Qing. The Impact of Sub-provincial Fiscal Decentralization and Promotion Competition on Environmental Quality: Theory and Evidence[J]. , 2021, 37(1): 14-23.

鲁玮骏, 骆勤. 省以下财政分权、晋升竞争与环境质量:理论与证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(1): 14-23.

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