Research on the Effectiveness of E-commerce Platform Reputation Mechanism and Credit Regulation——Evidence from Taobao and JD

›› 2021, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2): 103-112.

Research on the Effectiveness of E-commerce Platform Reputation Mechanism and Credit Regulation——Evidence from Taobao and JD

WANG Junhao, SHAN Fenxia, ZHANG Yuli

China Institute of Regulation Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China

Received:2020-07-09 Online:2021-02-10 Published:2021-03-17

电商平台声誉机制的有效性与信用监管研究——来自“淘宝”和“京东”的证据

王俊豪, 单芬霞, 张宇力

浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院,浙江杭州 310018

作者简介:王俊豪(1956-),男,浙江嵊州人,浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院教授;单芬霞(1995-),女,浙江绍兴人,浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院硕士生;张宇力(1996-),男,浙江湖州人,浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院硕士生。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA111)

Abstract

Abstract: This paper uses the data of Taobao and JD to study the effectiveness of the certification mechanism and the credit regulation from two aspects of consumer choice and seller decision. The results show that the certification mechanism and the credit regulation can significantly improve the positive effect of the reputation signal on sales and quality. What's more, on different platforms and in different credit environments, the influence of the reputation mechanism and the certification mechanism on goods quality is significantly different, and the platform with higher reputation and credit has more positive effects on improving goods quality. Otherwise, the reputation mechanism doesn't work well. These studies provide policy inspiration for strengthening credit regulation.

Key words: E-commerce, Reputation Mechanism, Credit Regulation, Quality Governance

摘要： 本文利用“淘宝”和“京东”的数据,从消费者选择和商家经营决策两方面实证认证机制和信用监管对声誉机制有效性的影响。研究结果发现,信用状态和认证机制能显著提高声誉信号对产品销量和质量的促进作用。不同平台和信用环境下声誉机制和认证机制对产品质量的影响具有显著差异性,在声誉和信用水平较高的平台环境下,声誉机制对产品质量的促进作用更为显著;否则,声誉机制无法有效发挥作用。据此,本文提出了加强信用监管的政策启示。

关键词: 电子商务, 声誉机制, 信用监管, 质量治理

CLC Number:

F724.6

WANG Junhao, SHAN Fenxia, ZHANG Yuli. Research on the Effectiveness of E-commerce Platform Reputation Mechanism and Credit Regulation——Evidence from Taobao and JD[J]. , 2021, 37(2): 103-112.

王俊豪, 单芬霞, 张宇力. 电商平台声誉机制的有效性与信用监管研究——来自“淘宝”和“京东”的证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(2): 103-112.

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