Firm Tax Contribution and Environmental Investment

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper investigates the relationship between firm tax contribution and its environmental investment using data of Chinese listed companies in the period from 2006 to 2017. Empirical results show that firms which contribute more in tax invest less in environmental protection. The effect is more pronounced in private firms and firms with no political connections, in heavily polluted industries which will benefit more from loose regulations, in regions with worse legal environment, less-developed economy and weaker public environmental awareness where local government can manipulate more in regulations. Our findings implicate that a healthy relationship between the government and firms are vital for achieving green development in China.

Key words: Tax Contribution, Tax Competition, Environmental Regulation, Firm Environmental Investment

摘要：

纳税贡献是影响企业享受地方政策的重要因素,本文基于2006~2017年上市公司数据探讨企业纳税贡献对绿色发展的影响。实证发现,企业纳税贡献越大,环境治理投资越少。这种效应主要存在于放松环境规制利益空间较大的重污染行业,以及无政治关联、非国有背景等其他类型政府关系较弱的企业。政府可以通过拓宽地方财政收入渠道、增强公众环境保护观念、改善地方法治环境等方式进行抑制。本文的启示是,落实企业环保主体责任需要塑造健康的政府与企业关系。

关键词: 纳税贡献, 税收竞争, 环境规制, 企业环保投资

CLC Number:

F812.42

LU Jiankun, JI Jiawen, DING Ming. Firm Tax Contribution and Environmental Investment[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2021, 37(9): 28-36.

鲁建坤, 纪珈雯, 丁明. 企业纳税贡献与环境治理投资[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(9): 28-36.

Figures/Tables 5

References 39

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变量	度量	观测值	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
环保投资	纳税总额的自然对数	5207	0.444	1.172	0.000	8.311
纳税贡献	环境资本支出/总资产	5207	18.718	1.519	10.019	24.061
杠杆率	资产负债率	5207	0.465	0.208	0.056	0.956
成长性	营业收入增加率	5207	0.202	0.492	-0.529	3.194
股权结构	前五大股东持股比例	5207	0.537	0.155	0.191	0.883
盈利能力	总资产收益率	5207	0.037	0.056	-0.190	0.209
是否国企	国有企业取1,否则取0	5207	0.490	0.500	0.000	1.000
第一股东	第一大股东持股比例	5207	0.364	0.149	0.093	0.753
经营现金流	经营性净现金流/总资产	5207	0.046	0.071	-0.165	0.248
人均收入	市级GDP总额/总人口	5207	7.300	3.815	1.348	17.796
环保观念	省级公众环保指数2007	5207	42.758	6.846	31.900	55.400

变量	度量	观测值	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
环保投资	纳税总额的自然对数	5207	0.444	1.172	0.000	8.311
纳税贡献	环境资本支出/总资产	5207	18.718	1.519	10.019	24.061
杠杆率	资产负债率	5207	0.465	0.208	0.056	0.956
成长性	营业收入增加率	5207	0.202	0.492	-0.529	3.194
股权结构	前五大股东持股比例	5207	0.537	0.155	0.191	0.883
盈利能力	总资产收益率	5207	0.037	0.056	-0.190	0.209
是否国企	国有企业取1,否则取0	5207	0.490	0.500	0.000	1.000
第一股东	第一大股东持股比例	5207	0.364	0.149	0.093	0.753
经营现金流	经营性净现金流/总资产	5207	0.046	0.071	-0.165	0.248
人均收入	市级GDP总额/总人口	5207	7.300	3.815	1.348	17.796
环保观念	省级公众环保指数2007	5207	42.758	6.846	31.900	55.400

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
纳税贡献	-0.077^***(-5.83)	-0.104^**(-2.03)	-0.098^**(-2.06)	-0.088^*(-1.69)
杠杆率	0.480^***(4.96)	0.387(1.43)	0.313(1.35)	0.600^**(2.07)
回报率	1.442^***(3.84)	0.813^**(2.25)	0.619(1.44)	0.879(1.44)
成长性	0.044(1.50)	-0.021(-0.57)	-0.030(-0.90)	-0.078^**(-2.03)
现金流	-0.399(-1.59)	-0.406^*(-1.66)	-0.328(-1.19)	-0.223(-0.57)
是否国企	-0.086^**(-2.27)	-0.056(-0.24)	0.016(0.08)	0.178(0.62)
第一股东	-0.173(-1.05)	-0.621(-1.54)	-0.399(-1.09)	-0.983(-1.63)
股权结构	0.254(1.62)	0.153(0.45)	0.076(0.23)	0.607(1.46)
环保观念	-0.000(-0.05)	0.052(0.88)	-0.007(-0.21)
人均收入	0.008^*(1.83)	0.032(1.24)	0.017(0.66)
Firm FE	否	是	是	是
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year FE	否	是	否	否
InduYear FE	否	否	是	是
CityYear FE	否	否	否	是
N	4911	4547	4404	3589
R²	0.016	0.509	0.391	0.389

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
纳税贡献	-0.077^***(-5.83)	-0.104^**(-2.03)	-0.098^**(-2.06)	-0.088^*(-1.69)
杠杆率	0.480^***(4.96)	0.387(1.43)	0.313(1.35)	0.600^**(2.07)
回报率	1.442^***(3.84)	0.813^**(2.25)	0.619(1.44)	0.879(1.44)
成长性	0.044(1.50)	-0.021(-0.57)	-0.030(-0.90)	-0.078^**(-2.03)
现金流	-0.399(-1.59)	-0.406^*(-1.66)	-0.328(-1.19)	-0.223(-0.57)
是否国企	-0.086^**(-2.27)	-0.056(-0.24)	0.016(0.08)	0.178(0.62)
第一股东	-0.173(-1.05)	-0.621(-1.54)	-0.399(-1.09)	-0.983(-1.63)
股权结构	0.254(1.62)	0.153(0.45)	0.076(0.23)	0.607(1.46)
环保观念	-0.000(-0.05)	0.052(0.88)	-0.007(-0.21)
人均收入	0.008^*(1.83)	0.032(1.24)	0.017(0.66)
Firm FE	否	是	是	是
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year FE	否	是	否	否
InduYear FE	否	否	是	是
CityYear FE	否	否	否	是
N	4911	4547	4404	3589
R²	0.016	0.509	0.391	0.389

变量	IV: RANK		IV: L1.TC
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
纳税贡献	-0.077^*** (-3.18)	-0.077^*** (-3.13)	-0.089^*** (-3.59)	-0.093^*** (-3.62)
Year FE	是	否	是	否
Indu FE	是	否	是	否
InduYear FE	否	是	否	是
N	4905	4782	4872	4754
R²	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.014