Ultimate Controller's Foreign Residency Right and Corporate Risk-taking: Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Private Companies

Abstract

Abstract:

In recent years, the proportion of ultimate controllers of listed private companies obtaining the foreign residency right continues to rise, which has been widely concerned. There are two possibilities for the impact of the foreign residency right on firms' risk-taking: the foreign residency right may intensify the agency conflict between ultimate controllers and minority shareholders and creditors, and strengthen the risk-taking willingness of ultimate controllers;it may also intensify the financing constraints and short-sighted investment behaviors, and increase the risk aversion degree of ultimate controllers. The empirical results support the former theoretical proposition. Further studies verify the private benefits of the control motive, the wealth dispersion motive and the resource advantage hypothesis in explaining ultimate controllers' risk-taking behaviors, but the risk transfer motive has not been verified. The legal environment will weaken the impact of the foreign residency right on firms' risk-taking, and ultimate controllers' participation in firms' governance will strengthen this impact. The foreign residency right does not affect the long-term operating intention of ultimate controllers. Risk-taking behaviors of ultimate controllers with the foreign residency right will produce a positive value promoting effect and enhance the firm value. This paper summarizes the theoretical logic of the effect of the foreign residency right of ultimate controllers on firms' risk-taking, enriches the research literature on characteristics of ultimate controllers and firms' decision-making, and has important implications for the corporate governance practice in China.

Key words: Ultimate Controller, Foreign Residency Right, Risk-taking, Private Listed Company

摘要：

近年来,上市民营公司的实际控制人取得境外居留权的比例持续上升,得到广泛关注。其对企业风险承担的影响存在正反两种可能性:境外居留权可能激化实际控制人与中小股东、债权人的代理冲突,提高实际控制人的风险承担意愿;也可能加剧融资约束和投资短视行为,加重实际控制人的风险规避程度。本文的实证研究结果支持了前一种理论预期。进一步研究验证了实际控制人风险承担的控制权私利动机、财富分散动机和资源优势假说,风险转移动机并未得到验证。法律环境会弱化境外居留权对企业风险承担的影响,实际控制人参与治理会加强该影响。境外居留权并未影响实际控制人的长期经营意愿。实际控制人境外居留权的风险承担行为会产生积极的价值促进效应,提升企业价值。本文完整地梳理了实际控制人境外居留权影响企业风险承担的理论逻辑,丰富了实际控制人特征与企业决策的研究文献,对我国公司治理实践具有重要启示。

关键词: 实际控制人, 境外居留权, 风险承担, 民营公司

CLC Number:

F270
F275

WANG Man, CHEN Zhenhong, MA Ying. Ultimate Controller's Foreign Residency Right and Corporate Risk-taking: Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Private Companies[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2021, 37(9): 71-81.

王满, 陈珍红, 马影. 实际控制人境外居留权与企业风险承担——来自A股上市民营公司的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(9): 71-81.

Figures/Tables 7

References 25

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Panel A:全样本描述性统计
变量	样本量	均值	标准差	最小值	中位数	最大值
RiskT	7921	0.422	0.279	0.084	0.344	1.544
FRR	7921	0.094	0.291	0.000	0.000	1.000
Size	7921	21.793	1.085	19.098	21.742	24.857
Lev	7921	0.414	0.201	0.050	0.406	0.886
Growth	7921	0.290	0.838	-0.649	0.136	6.444
Fage	7921	2.756	0.351	1.792	2.773	3.401
Ownership	7921	0.307	0.135	0.079	0.287	0.703
Indratio	7921	0.376	0.053	0.333	0.333	0.571
Mhold	7921	0.144	0.191	0.000	0.025	0.830
Panel B:风险承担的单变量检验
分组	样本量	标准差	均值	t值	中位数	z值
有境外居留权样本	742	0.281	0.442	1.993^**	0.365	2.829^***
无境外居留权样本	7179	0.278	0.420	0.341

Panel A:全样本描述性统计
变量	样本量	均值	标准差	最小值	中位数	最大值
RiskT	7921	0.422	0.279	0.084	0.344	1.544
FRR	7921	0.094	0.291	0.000	0.000	1.000
Size	7921	21.793	1.085	19.098	21.742	24.857
Lev	7921	0.414	0.201	0.050	0.406	0.886
Growth	7921	0.290	0.838	-0.649	0.136	6.444
Fage	7921	2.756	0.351	1.792	2.773	3.401
Ownership	7921	0.307	0.135	0.079	0.287	0.703
Indratio	7921	0.376	0.053	0.333	0.333	0.571
Mhold	7921	0.144	0.191	0.000	0.025	0.830
Panel B:风险承担的单变量检验
分组	样本量	标准差	均值	t值	中位数	z值
有境外居留权样本	742	0.281	0.442	1.993^**	0.365	2.829^***
无境外居留权样本	7179	0.278	0.420	0.341

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FRR	0.021^**(1.99)	0.023^**(2.18)	0.025^**(2.42)	0.024^**(2.26)	0.027^***(2.60)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Industry	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Adj. R²	0.000	0.015	0.050	0.033	0.068

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
FRR	0.021^**(1.99)	0.023^**(2.18)	0.025^**(2.42)	0.024^**(2.26)	0.027^***(2.60)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Industry	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Adj. R²	0.000	0.015	0.050	0.033	0.068

变量	(1)两权分离度高	(2)两权分离度低	(3)RiskT
FRR	0.038^**(2.45)	0.015(1.08)
FRR_EX			0.011(0.40)
FRR_NOEX			0.030^***(2.67)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year/Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3796	4125	7921
Adj. R²	0.086	0.063	0.068