Abstract:

The management of the ride-hailing market lags behind the market development. The problems are manifested in the government regulation and the intervention in the market behavior. The purpose of this paper is to improve the coupling between the theory and the practice. This paper builds different game models to study the path which can promote the development of the ride-hailing market. The“thief guard” game model is used to explain the reasons why the government regulation intensity and the regulation effect are repeated. The incentive paradox is applied to explain the logic that in the long term, increasing penalties for ride-hailing companies can ease the lack of the regulatory resources and greater punishment on government regulators can reduce ride-hailing companies' illegal behavior. Influencing factors are introduced as independent variables to extend the “thief guard” game model, revealing that effective regulation should focus on such influencing factors as the intensity of the punishment and the amount of the regulation resources. Moreover, based on the Bertrand model and the Cournot model, this paper constructs repeated games with uncertain ending time to analyze the competition strategy of the two stages of the ride-hailing market. It is suggested that measures be taken to stabilize the “prisoner's dilemma” situation, that is, increase the temptation of non-cooperation, reduce the discount rate, increase the number of market players, and give full play to the “maximization and minimization strategy”.

Key words: Government Regulation, Competition, Game, The Prisoner's Dilemma, Optimal Path

摘要：

本文从提高理论与实践的耦合性出发,建立博弈模型研究促进网约车市场发展的路径,利用“小偷守卫”博弈模型解释政府监管力度与监管效果不断反复的原因。根据“激励悖论”,本文解释了长期内加大对网约车平台的惩罚力度能缓解行政资源的不足,以及加大对政府监管机构的惩罚能减少网约车平台的违法行为。引入影响因素作为自变量扩展“小偷守卫”博弈模型后,本文揭示根据约束条件从不同的政策目标出发,针对不同的违法行为,通过调整监管资源投入、对双方的惩罚力度实现监管动态平衡的路径。以伯特兰德模型和古诺模型为基础,本文构建不确定结束时点的重复博弈,分析网约车市场发展两个阶段的竞争策略。从增进社会福利的视角,提出增强不合作的诱惑、降低贴现率、增加市场主体数量、发挥“极大化极小策略”的作用等措施巩固“囚徒困境”的稳定性。

关键词: 政府监管, 竞争, 博弈, 囚徒困境, 优化路径