Abstract:

As global economic uncertainty increases and China’s economy enters the stage of “new normal”, tax reduction and fee reduction for enterprises and increasing the vitality of the real economy have become the focus of the economic work. Using dynamic collusion theory, this paper provides a new perspective for understanding the effective tax rate of Chinese enterprises. Firstly, this paper uses the basic idea of the relational contract to extend the traditional collusion theory to a dynamic form. In equilibrium, with the increase of the tenure of local government officials, the collusion between the local government and enterprises also increases. Secondly, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the officials’ tenure and the effective tax rate of enterprises by using data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database from 1998 to 2013 and the data of municipal Party secretaries of prefecture-level cities in China from 1998 to 2013. The longer the tenure of the municipal Party secretary is, the lower the effective tax rate will be. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance for the further promotion of tax reduction and fee reduction for enterprises in China.

Key words: Officials’ Tenure, Effective Tax Rate, Collusion

摘要：

在当前全球经济不确定性增加、中国经济步入新常态的背景下,为企业减税降费、增加实体经济活力成为经济工作的重点。本文从动态合谋理论的角度为理解中国企业的实际税负提供了一个新的视角。首先,本文使用关系契约的基本思路将传统合谋理论扩展到动态形式。在均衡下,随着地方政府官员任期的增加,政企合谋也随之增加。其次,本文使用1998—2013年中国工业企业数据库数据以及1998—2013年中国地级市市委书记数据对官员任期与企业实际税负之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,市委书记任期越长,政企合谋就越严重,企业实际税负就越低。本文的研究结论对我国进一步推进企业减税降费工作具有重要意义。

关键词: 官员任期, 实际税负, 政企合谋