Abstract: The equity method is one of the accounting treatments for the long-term investment. The Chinese accounting standard No. 2 (CAS2(2006, 2014)) requires that the equity method is applied to the investments for the associate and the joint ventures. However, CAS2(2006, 2014) gives management considerable direction on the equity method application. Specifically, when a company recognizes the associates, CAS2(2006, 2014)allows the management judgement to be the criterion for the recognition. Thus, the management will use the direction offered by the CAS2(2006, 2014) to manipulate the equity method.
The equity method requires that the investment is initially recorded at cost and adjusted for the change in the investors' share of the investees' net assets. When the investors use the equity method for the investment, the investors should recognize whether its proportionate share of the net profit or the loss from the associates and joint ventures is remitted as a dividend or not. So, when the investees have stable net profit, the management has strong intentions to use the equity method to measure the investment.
This paper investigates whether the newly-appointed management will use the equity method for earnings management, and whether the management will get reward for the equity method profits. Empirical results are as follows: (1) The newly-appointed management will manipulate the equity method to increase the profits; (2) The management compensation contracts treat the equity method profits as the regular component of earnings, and do not recognize that the management may manipulate the equity method for the earnings management. Specifically, when the company recognizes higher equity profits or recognizes an investment measure by the equity method, the management will have a higher compensation.
This study enriches the relevant research on the equity method and provides new evidence for the study on the real earnings management, that is, the successor management will manipulate the equity method to beautify the financial statement. Furthermore, the empirical results have implications for the Chinese SEC, which should strengthen the supervision of the equity method application. Specifically, SEC should pay attention to the listed firms which use the equity method after the successor management takes office. Also, the Chinese SEC can consider excluding the profits from the equity method when formulating the regulatory indicators.

Key words: Equity Method, Earnings Management, Executive Turnover, Management Compensation

摘要： 本文以2007—2018年我国上市公司为样本,实证检验了新任高管是否运用权益法进行盈余管理,以及高管薪酬契约如何看待权益法的运用。研究结果表明,由于现行会计准则CAS2(2006,2014)关于权益法实施条件的规定弹性较大,权益法创造利润的能力较强,上市公司新任高管上任后会操纵权益法调增利润;但管理层薪酬契约高度认可采用权益法核算的投资收益,并未考虑权益法易被操纵的现状。本文丰富并深化了权益法使用后果的相关研究,为会计准则制定部门评价CAS2(2006,2014)的实施效果提供了经验证据。

关键词: 权益法, 盈余管理, 高管变更, 管理层薪酬契约