Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (8): 69-79.

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Managerial Ability and Enterprise Strategic Risk Taking: “March Forward”or“Shrink Back”?

FU Junhui, YANG Jiawei, XIA Yujia, MO Yanling   

  1. School of Finance,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China
  • Received:2021-12-10 Online:2022-08-10 Published:2022-09-06

管理者能力与企业战略风险承担:“迎风而上”还是“遇险而退”?

傅俊辉, 杨佳伟, 夏宇佳, 莫嫣玲   

  1. 浙江财经大学金融学院,浙江 杭州 310018
  • 作者简介:傅俊辉(1983—),男,浙江金华人,浙江财经大学金融学院教授;杨佳伟(1998—),男,浙江台州人,浙江财经大学金融学院硕士生;夏宇佳(1998—),女,浙江绍兴人,浙江财经大学金融学院硕士生;莫嫣玲(1998—),女,浙江绍兴人,浙江财经大学金融学院硕士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71631005;71401151) ;教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(19YJA790013);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LQ21G010005)

Abstract: Will more competent managers choose to improve strategic risk-taking or to avoid strategic risk-taking? Using a sample of non-financial A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2020, this paper investigates the influence of the managerial ability on enterprises' strategic risk-taking. The findings reveal that managers with more outstanding ability will decrease their firms' strategic risk-taking, which supports the risk avoidance hypothesis. This finding still holds after the robustness and endogenous test. Mediation mechanism research demonstrates that the managerial ability reduces the level of enterprises' strategic risk-taking by lessening the degree of strategic radicalization. Further discussion indicates that better corporate governance mechanism and higher economic policy uncertainty can alleviate the negative correlation between the managerial ability and enterprises' strategic risk-taking. In addition, the inhibitory effect is more pronounced for the listed companies with higher level of marketization, lower default risk and stronger financial constraints.

Key words: Managerial Ability, Strategic Risk-taking, Strategic Radicalization, Corporate Governance Mechanism, Economic Policy Uncertainty

摘要: 能力更杰出的管理者在面对战略风险承担决策时,会不惧风险而迎难向前还是畏惧风险而选择退缩?本文采用2010—2020年沪深A股非金融上市公司样本,研究了管理者能力对战略风险承担的影响。研究结果表明,能力越突出的管理者越有可能降低公司的战略风险承担,这支持了风险规避假说。稳健性和内生性检验结果显示该抑制效应依旧成立。中介机制研究表明,管理者能力通过降低战略激进度来减少企业战略风险承担水平。进一步的讨论表明,更完善的公司治理机制和更高的经济政策不确定性可以缓解管理者能力对企业战略风险承担的抑制效应。此外,对于所处地区市场化程度较高、违约风险较低、财务约束较强的上市公司,这种抑制效应更为显著。

关键词: 管理者能力, 战略风险承担, 战略激进度, 公司治理机制, 经济政策不确定性

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