Abstract: As the foundation of the development of the party and the country, state-owned enterprises play an irreplaceable role in the process of China's economic development and the realization of strategic goals. However, the zombified phenomenon of some state-owned enterprises hinders the play of their role. The emerging shareholding mode of institutional co-ownership not only makes the institutional co-investors have much greater control rights and discourse power than the retail shareholders in the company, but also enables them to form information networks among enterprises in the same industry, master more sufficient industry information and richer governance experience, which is more likely to have an impact on the governance of state-owned zombie enterprises. Therefore, whether institutional co-ownership can be introduced to achieve market-oriented governance of state-owned zombie enterprises? The answer to this question can not only enrich the study of institutional co-ownership and corporate behavior in enterprises with different characteristics in China's special capital market, but also provide useful ideas for the proper disposal of state-owned zombie enterprises, so as to optimize the efficiency of the social resource allocation and promote the healthy development of China's economy.
Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as samples and based on the quarterly data of institutional co-ownership collected manually, this paper uses the logit regression analysis method to explore the influence of institutional co-ownership on the de-zombification of state-owned enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the participation of institutional co-investors in the high-level governance of state-owned enterprises can inhibit the zombification of state-owned enterprises, and this conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests such as the instrumental variable method, the propensity score matching and the heckman two-stage method. The mechanism test show that institutional co-investors inhibit the zombification of state-owned enterprises mainly by alleviating the principal-agent problems and improving the product market performance. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of institutional co-ownership on the zombification of state-owned enterprises is more prominent in the samples of local state-owned enterprises, and samples with small management power and low information transparency. The study also finds that the development quality of state-owned zombie enterprises governed by institutional co-investors has been significantly improved.
The policy implications of this paper are mainly reflected in the following three aspects: Firstly, listed companies should recognize the positive role of institutional co-investors in promoting the collaborative enterprise behavior and improving the corporate governance mechanism. They should create conditions to actively introduce high-quality institutional co-investors into shares, increase their number and shareholding ratio, optimize the ownership structure, improve the corporate governance, and promote the long-term value creation of enterprises. Secondly, government regulators should provide a good governance environment for the development of institutional co-investors at the institutional level, further cultivate and develop the ability of institutional co-investors to participate in the corporate governance by using information advantages and management experience, encourage enterprises to actively introduce institutional co-investors, and improve the corporate governance mechanism by means of introducing institutional co-investors in the capital market. Thirdly, the positive governance role of institutional co-investors faces many constraints. In order to further play the positive role of institutional co-investors, it is necessary to limit the excessive power of executives in state-owned enterprises, improve the quality of the corporate information disclosure, and better protect the healthy development of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: Institutional Co-ownership, State-owned Enterprise, De-zombification

摘要： 国有企业是国民经济的重要支柱,如何妥善解决部分国有企业僵尸化问题是做大做优做强国有企业与实现中国经济高质量发展的重要环节。本文基于机构信息网络视角,探讨并实证检验机构共同持股对国有企业僵尸化的影响。研究发现:机构共同持股能够抑制国有企业僵尸化,且这一抑制作用主要通过缓解委托代理问题与提升产品市场表现等路径来实现。进一步的异质性分析表明,机构共同持股对国有企业僵尸化的抑制作用在地方国有企业、管理层权力小以及信息透明度低的样本中更为显著。经济后果检验发现,被机构共同持股的国有僵尸企业发展质量得到了显著提升。本文研究结论不仅丰富了对机构共同持股这一新兴学术前沿的认知,同时也为通过市场化手段帮助国有企业去僵尸化提供了新的证据支持。

关键词: 机构共同持股, 国有企业, 去僵尸化