Abstract: An inquiry letter is a flexible regulatory system forlisted companieson the stock exchange, mainly asking questions about abnormal performances, operational risks and information disclosure, and requiring companies to respond within a limited period of time. Unlike past substantial penalties, inquiry lettersgivecompanies time and space to explain and correct, and therefore have a different impact on companies' willingness to innovate. Based on the R&D inquiries proposed by the stock exchange, this paper empirically tests the impact of the R&D inquiries on companies' willingness to innovate. It is found that the R&D inquiries have an enhancing effect on companies' willingness to innovate. This effect is amplified by letters of inquiry that require an accountant's response, while it is weakened by letters of inquiry that require a lawyer's response. Sensitivity analysis found that state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and enterprises with lower levels of R&D manipulation have a more sensitive response to inquiry letters and their response needs.

Key words: Inquiry Letter, Flexible Supervision, R&D Inquiry, Innovation Willingness

摘要： 问询函是证劵交易所对上市公司的一种柔性监管制度,主要针对公司业绩异常、经营风险和信息披露提出问询,要求公司在限定日期之内回复。不同于过去的实质性处罚措施,问询函给予了公司解释与改正的时间和空间,因此对公司创新意愿的影响也会有所区别。本文基于交易所提出的研发问询,实证检验研发问询对上市公司创新意愿产生的影响,研究发现,研发问询对公司创新意愿有提升效应。需要会计师回复的问询函能够放大这种效应,而需要律师回复的问询函却削弱了这种效应。敏感性分析发现,在国有、高科技型和不存在研发操纵现象的公司,这种效应更明显。

关键词: 问询函, 柔性监管, 研发问询, 创新意愿