Research on the Spatial Effect of Environmental Regulation on Regional Ecological Efficiency: Based on the Regulatory Role of Fiscal Decentralization

Abstract

Abstract: This paper uses the super efficiency SBM model of unexpected output to calculate the regional ecological efficiency indicators of 30 provinces in China from 2007 to 2019, and empirically tests the impact of environmental regulation and fiscal decentralization on regional ecological efficiency. The results show that there is an inverted U relationship between environmental regulation and regional ecological efficiency, and the implementation of environmental regulation policies has spatial spillover effects. Besides, there is regional heterogeneity in the effect of environmental regulation on regional ecological efficiency and the implementation effect is relatively significant in the western region. Further analysis finds that there is an obvious threshold effect of fiscal decentralization in the impact of environmental regulation on regional ecological efficiency. When the degree of fiscal decentralization is high, the implementation effect of environmental regulation is particularly significant. The above conclusions have certain theoretical and policy implications for local governments to improve and strengthen environmental regulation policies, further optimize the design of fiscal decentralization system, and realize the benign interaction between environmental regulation, fiscal decentralization and regional ecological efficiency.

Key words: Environmental Regulation, Fiscal Decentralization, Regional Ecological Efficiency, Spatial Dobbin Model, Threshold Effect

摘要： 本文采用非期望产出的超效率SBM模型,测算2007—2019年中国30个省份的区域生态效率指标,实证检验环境规制、财政分权对区域生态效率的影响。结果表明,环境规制与区域生态效率之间呈倒U型关系,且环境规制政策的实施存在空间溢出效应;环境规制对区域生态效率的影响效果具有空间异质性,在西部地区的实施效果较为显著。进一步分析发现,环境规制对区域生态效率的影响产生明显的财政分权门槛效应,在财政分权程度较高时,环境规制的实施效果尤为显著。上述结论对地方政府完善环境规制政策、优化财政分权制度设计,实现环境规制、财政分权与区域生态效率的良性互动具有一定的理论和政策启示。

关键词: 环境规制, 财政分权, 区域生态效率, 空间杜宾模型, 门槛效应

CLC Number:

X321

SHAO Wei, JIN Zebin, CHEN Ziqi. Research on the Spatial Effect of Environmental Regulation on Regional Ecological Efficiency: Based on the Regulatory Role of Fiscal Decentralization[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(6): 103-112.

邵慰, 金泽斌, 陈子琦. 环境规制对区域生态效率的空间效应研究: 基于财政分权的调节作用[J]. 财经论丛, 2023, 39(6): 103-112.

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