Abstract: Although China's securities market has developed into the world's second largest multi-level market over the past 30 years, the issue of protecting small- and mid-cap investors has not been adequately addressed. One of the main reasons for this lack of protection is the low cost of violating laws and regulations in the securities market. However, in December 2019, the Revised Securities Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the 15^th session of the Standing Committee of the 13^th National People's Congress. This revision has significantly increased the cost of law violations and enhanced legal deterrence.
To assess the impact of the new Securities Law, this paper examines the data of A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021 using the difference-in-differences method. The research findings indicate that, compared to the period before the implementation of the new Securities Law, audit pricing for listed companies has significantly improved after its implementation. Specifically, the audit pricing for companies with poor information disclosure has seen greater improvement. Mechanism analysis reveals that, in order to reduce the risk of audit failure, auditors have increased their investment to alleviate the issue of excessively low audit pricing. They have also charged higher premiums to companies with higher operating risks and lower governance levels. Furthermore, additional research indicates that after the implementation of the new Securities Law, companies with poor information disclosure have experienced greater improvements in earnings quality and lower probability of financial restatements. This study contributes to the existing research on law and finance, expands the literature on the impact of formulating or revising laws on the securities market, and provides a new perspective for evaluating the effectiveness of the new Securities Law. Ultimately, this research is beneficial for the formulation and improvement of laws and regulations in China's securities market.
This paper suggests that the implementation of the new Securities Law has implications for both listed companies and intermediaries such as accounting firms. On one hand, the law affects the behavior of listed companies and promotes intermediaries to invest more resources and avoid low-price competition. This helps create a favorable industry ecology and improves investor protection on a larger scale. Increasing punishment for illegal behaviors and the probability of punishment can encourage intermediaries to increase their work input, reduce low-price competition, and increase risk premiums. This, in turn, improves the quality of work and strengthens investor protection. On the other hand, after the implementation of the new Securities Law, companies with high risk and low governance levels may need to pay higher audit fees compared to other companies. As the legal environment in our country develops, this effect becomes more significant. Additionally, it may lead to increased spending on other intermediary services by companies. Therefore, it is suggested that managers should focus on controlling management risks and improving governance levels. This not only contributes to the healthy development of the company but also helps reduce intermediary fees significantly.

Key words: Securities Law, Audit Pricing, Audit Quality

摘要： 2019年《证券法》的修订是我国证券市场法制发展的重要里程碑,大幅提高了对证券市场违法违规行为的惩罚和威慑力度。采用双重差分法探究新《证券法》实施对审计定价影响的结果表明,新《证券法》实施后,上市公司的审计定价显著提升,且对于信息披露质量越差的公司,其定价提升幅度越大。机制检验表明,新《证券法》实施后,审计工作的时长显著增加、审计定价过低的现象得到缓解、高风险以及治理水平较低公司的审计风险溢价显著提升。进一步研究表明,在新《证券法》实施后,相比信息披露质量较好的公司,信息披露质量较差公司的盈余质量提升幅度和财务重述概率下降幅度均更大。上述研究结论为我国证券市场法律法规的制定和修订提供了有益的经验证据和理论依据,为企业管理者应对严格的制度环境提供了有针对性的启示。

关键词: 证券法, 审计定价, 审计质量