Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2024, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (8): 78-88.

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Social Security Fee Collection and Salary Gap within Firms

ZHOU Kuo1, ZHAO Tianyu2, SHU Hao3   

  1. 1. Northeast Asian Research Center, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China;
    2. School of Economics, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Agricultural University, Hefei 230036, China
  • Received:2024-03-18 Online:2024-08-10 Published:2024-08-12

社保费征管与企业内部薪酬差距

周阔1, 赵天宇2, 舒浩3   

  1. 1.吉林大学东北亚研究中心,吉林 长春 130012;
    2.吉林大学经济学院,吉林 长春 130012;
    3.安徽农业大学经济管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230036
  • 作者简介:周阔(1991—),女,吉林榆树人,吉林大学东北亚研究中心讲师;赵天宇(2002—),男,陕西子长人,吉林大学经济学院硕士生;舒浩(1994—),男,安徽霍山人,安徽农业大学经济管理学院特任副教授。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(23YJC790205);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2023-JCXK-16)

Abstract: This paper uses the Social Insurance Law promulgated and implemented in 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the governance effect of social insurance premium collection on pay gaps within firms. It is found that the strengthening of social security fee collection and management has a significant negative effect on the salary gap within firms. This effect is mainly reflected in the implementation of the “Social Insurance Law” reducing the excess compensation of executives rather than increasing the compensation of ordinary employees. Mechanism analysis shows that after the implementation of the Social Insurance Law, information asymmetry has significantly decreased, the principal-agent problem has been alleviated, and the power of senior executives has been effectively constrained, thereby reducing the internal salary gap. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the governance effect of social security fee collection and management is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with low-quality information disclosure and internal control, and high level of regional legalization. In addition, the promulgation of the Social Security Law rationalizes the pay gap within enterprises and improves corporate performance. This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of social security fee collection and administration, and provides a reference for the improvement of the income distribution and social security system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the construction of a road to common prosperity.

Key words: Social Insurance Law, Pay Gap, Corporate Governance

摘要: 企业内部收入分配不平等是收入分配极化的重要成因,构建科学合理的薪酬制度体系,对于缩小收入分配差距、实现全体人民共同富裕具有重要意义。本文以《社会保险法》的实施为准自然实验,检验了社保费征管对企业内部薪酬差距的治理作用。研究发现,社保费征管力度的强化对企业内部薪酬差距具有显著的抑制效应,这一效应主要体现为《社会保险法》的实施降低了高管超额薪酬,而非普通员工薪酬。机制分析表明,《社会保险法》实施后,企业信息不对称程度降低、委托代理问题缓解以及高管权力得到有效约束,进而缩小了内部薪酬差距。异质性分析表明,社保费征管的治理效应在非国有企业、信息披露与内部控制质量低以及地区法治化水平高的企业中表现更为明显。此外,社保费征管对企业内部薪酬差距的改善也有助于企业业绩的提升。本文丰富了社保费征管的经济后果研究,为中国特色社会主义收入分配与社会保障制度的完善以及共同富裕道路的探索提供参考。

关键词: 社会保险法, 薪酬差距, 公司治理

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