Abstract: This paper analyzes the formation mechanism of corporate fraud based on the fraud triangle theory, considering the reality of repeated fraud by listed companies. The results indicate that enterprises with poor performance are highly motivated to engage in fraudulent activities and will employ various measures to do so. Furthermore, as a state of poor performance persists longer, the probability and severity of fraud increase. The mechanism test reveals that the increasing internal agency problem is an important driving force behind fraudulent behaviors among inferior firms. Additionally, poor enterprise performance increases the likelihood of shareholder and management fraud. Moreover, when a company faces higher internal financial risks or operates in a challenging external environment, there is an increased probability of fraudulent activity. Further research finds that when fraud is revealed through an audit of a public company, it tends to lead to a negative reputation effect. The relevant conclusions expand the application boundary of the fraud triangle theory and the research extension of the performance feedback theory, and can provide reference for the supervision and prevention of the fraud behavior of listed companies.

Key words: Corporate Governance, Inferior Firms, Fraud Triangle Theory, Corporate Fraud, Performance Feedback

摘要： 本文立足于上市公司违规行为屡禁不止的现实情境,基于舞弊三角理论剖析绩劣企业违规行为的发生机理。结果表明:绩劣企业具有较强的违规倾向且会采取多样的违规手段,而且绩劣状态持续时间越长,其违规的概率和程度越高。机制检验揭示,不断加剧的内部代理问题是导致绩劣企业违规的重要驱动机制。进一步区分违规主体发现,企业的绩劣状态会同时增加股东与管理层违规的可能性。此外,在公司内部财务风险较高或外部经营环境较差的情况下,绩劣企业违规的可能性更大。拓展研究发现,当上市公司违规行为被稽查揭示后,往往会引发负面声誉效应。相关结论拓展了舞弊三角理论的应用边界以及绩效反馈理论的研究外延,可以为上市公司违规行为的监管和防范提供参考和借鉴。

关键词: 公司治理, 绩劣企业, 舞弊三角理论, 公司违规, 绩效反馈