Abstract: With the advancement of information technology, platform firms are able to implement personalized pricing strategies based on consumers' private information. However, real-world scenarios, additional complexity arises because consumers must consider not only transactional fairness but also the concealment of information to protect their privacy. This study proposes a game-theoretic model to explore whether platform firms should be transparent about their personalized pricing strategies taking into account consumers' fairness and privacy preferences by studying their pricing strategies in a dynamic market environment. The findings reveal that when anonymity costs are high, platform firms that disregard consumer fairness and implement transparent personalized pricing strategies can increase their profits. However, this comes at the expense of reduced consumer surplus and social welfare. When anonymity costs are moderate, platform firms consider consumer fairness and profits under opaque strategies exceed transparent strategies, but consumer surplus and social welfare tend to decrease as anonymity costs increase. From the perspective of public policymakers, mandating disclosure of consumer data collection and usage practices may inadvertently harm consumer interests. Thus, when advocating for transparent personalized pricing strategies, platform firms should carefully evaluate such decisions, considering consumer anonymity costs and fairness preferences. This study reveals the impacts of transparent and personalized pricing strategies on platform profitability, consumer welfare, and social welfare through a game-theoretic model, which provides new theoretical perspectives on the optimization of platform firms' pricing strategies, and informs policymakers' decision-making in balancing profits, consumer fairness, and privacy protection.

Key words: Personalized Pricing, Consumer Privacy, Consumer Fairness, Social Welfare

摘要： 随着信息技术的日益成熟,平台企业能够基于消费者隐私信息实施个性化定价策略。然而,现实中的情境具有较多的复杂性,消费者需要考虑交易的公平性,还需要考虑通过隐藏信息来保护隐私。本文提出一个博弈论模型,通过研究平台企业在动态市场环境中的定价策略,探讨平台企业是否应该在考虑消费者公平和隐私偏好的情况下提供其透明的个性化定价策略。研究结果表明,当匿名成本较大时,平台企业若不考虑消费者公平,并向消费者提供透明的个性化定价策略会增加其利润,但同时会减少消费者剩余和社会福利。当匿名成本适中时,平台企业若考虑消费者公平,不透明的个性化定价策略会增加其利润,但随着匿名成本的增加,消费者剩余和社会福利呈下降趋势。从公共政策制定者的角度看,要求平台企业公开消费者数据的收集和使用情况可能会损害消费者的利益。当公共政策制定者提倡企业公开个性化定价策略时,平台企业应评估透明的个性化定价策略的实施,并考虑消费者的公平强度和匿名成本。本研究通过博弈论模型揭示透明的个性化定价策略对平台企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,为平台企业定价策略的优化提供新的理论视角,也为政策制定者提供在平衡利润、消费者公平和隐私保护之间的决策参考。

关键词: 个性化定价, 消费者隐私, 消费者公平, 社会福利