Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2026, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (9): 77-87.

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New Refinancing Regulations and Patient Capital Investment

TIAN Zihao1, QIU Rong2, LI Huamin3   

  1. 1. School of Economics, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China;
    2. Western Modernization Research Center, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China;
    3. South China Institute of Innovative Finance, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou 510521, China
  • Received:2025-09-22 Online:2026-09-10 Published:2026-09-10

“再融资新规”与耐心资本投资

田子豪1, 邱蓉2, 李华民3   

  1. 1.四川大学经济学院,四川 成都 610065;
    2.贵州财经大学西部现代化研究中心,贵州 贵阳 550025;
    3.广东金融学院华南创新金融研究院,广东 广州 510521
  • 通讯作者: 李华民(1967—),男,河南濮阳人,广东金融学院华南创新金融研究院教授。
  • 作者简介:田子豪(1999—),男,河北保定人,四川大学经济学院博士生;邱蓉(1970—),女,湖北保安县人,贵州财经大学西部现代化研究中心教授。

Abstract: By relaxing financing conditions for ChiNext-listed companies, the“New Refinancing Regulations”have deregulated the financing market, which theoretically provides a crucial institutional foundation for patient capital investment. However, its actual effects demand empirical validation. Using the 2020 Regulations as an institutional backdrop, this paper employs a difference-in-differences (DID) design on panel data of ChiNext-listed firms from 2013 to 2023 to examine the impact of easing financing thresholds on patient capital. We find that while the Regulations enhance financing convenience, the relaxation of eligibility criteria weakens the inherent screening function of entry requirements, intensifying adverse selection under pre-existing information asymmetry. Long-term capital, being more information-sensitive, retreats first, forcing firms to resort to short-term instruments under tightened supply constraints, thereby exerting an unintended substitution effect on patient capital, which is more pronounced in non-state-owned and high-tech enterprises. Mechanism tests indicate that this substitution effect is primarily driven by deviations in capital structure and deterioration in earnings information quality. Further analysis reveals that cultivating firms' long-term strategic orientation and strengthening external monitoring can effectively mitigate the unintended consequences of this policy deregulation. Accordingly, the paper recommends designing differentiated policy mixes, prioritizing the cultivation of long-term corporate value, and enhancing external supervision to smooth investment channels for patient capital.

Key words: New Refinancing Regulations, Patient Capital, Government-Guided Funds, Financing Preferences

摘要: “再融资新规”通过放宽创业板上市公司的融资条件实现了对融资市场的“政策松绑”,理论上为耐心资本投资提供了重要制度基础,但其效果如何亟待经验验证。本文以2020年“再融资新规”为制度背景,基于2013—2023年创业板上市公司数据,利用双重差分法考察融资条件放宽对耐心资本投资的影响。研究发现,“再融资新规”在提升融资便利性的同时弱化了市场准入条件的信号功能,从而对耐心资本投资产生了替代效应,且该效应在非国有和高科技公司中更加明显。机制分析表明,该替代效应主要是通过资本结构调整与盈余信息质量变化实现的。进一步分析发现,提升公司管理层长期视野和强化外部监管能够纾解“政策松绑”的非预期效应。据此,建议采用差异化政策组合、注重公司长期价值培育及加强外部监管,畅通耐心资本投资渠道。

关键词: 再融资新规, 耐心资本, 政府引导基金, 融资偏好

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