Abstract: What is conduction mechanism and micro-foundation of that fiscal decentralization affects the size of government? This paper regarded civil servant wages as pathway and the microeconomic foundation of fiscal decentralization affecting government size, used panel data of Chinese 30 provinces in 1995-2009 as samples dynamic regression model -System GMM to make theoretical analysis and empirical research. We found that: (i) the fiscal expenditure decentralization would expand government size, but fiscal revenue decentralization would cut local governments size. The civil servants’ wages promoted the government size. (ii) Fiscal revenue decentralization was positively correlated with civil servants’ wage. Society average wages and per capita GDP expanded civil servants’ wages. The consumer price index was negatively correlated with civil servants’ wages. (iii) At present, China's local government civil servants’ wages could not be the microeconomic basis of fiscal decentralization’s affecting on local government size. At last, we draw some policy recommendations based on the findings.

摘要： 财政分权影响政府规模的传导机制和微观基础到底是什么？本文以公务员工资作为财政分权影响政府规模的传导途径和微观基础，利用我国1995-2009年30个省、市、自治区的面板数据作为样本，采用动态回归方法—系统广义矩进行了实证研究，发现：（1）财政支出分权会扩大政府支出规模，而财政收入分权有利于地方政府缩减支出规模；公务员工资水平对政府支出规模扩张有推动作用；（2）财政收入分权与公务员工资水平正相关；全社会工资水平和人均GDP对公务员工资水平有增长作用；而居民消费物价指数却与公务员工资水平负相关；（3）目前，我国地方政府公务员工资水平还不能成为财政分权影响地方政府支出规模的微观基础。并在此基础上提出了相应的参考建议。