›› 2014, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (1): 56-63.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of Social Intermediaries Involved in Village-Level Accounting Principal-Agent Services

,   

  • Received:2013-08-31 Revised:2013-10-24 Online:2014-01-10 Published:2013-11-29

社会中介参与村级会计委托代理服务的演化博弈分析

傅黎瑛,杨银川   

  1. 浙江财经大学
  • 通讯作者: 傅黎瑛
  • 基金资助:

    会计代理制时期我国村级财务治理机制研究:以浙江省为例

Abstract: In China, the village accounting principal-agent system has two modes: one in Zhejiang Province is representative and promoted widely in the country, namely, “the village account town agency” mode; the other, carried out in Foshan City, Guangdong Province, introduced by accounting firms of village accountants, is called “village accounts by proxy ” mode. This article, using principles of evolutionary game theory, analyzes the feasibility and advantage of social intermediary participation in the village-level accounting principal-agent operation, and proposes that the “village account town agency” mode with social intermediaries (such as accounting firms) is more in line with the reality and current of rural financial management in China.

摘要: 在我国,村级会计委托代理制存在两种现实模式:一是以浙江省为代表并在全国范围内普遍推广的“村账镇代理”模式,另有广东佛山市推行的由会计师事务所代理村会计核算的“村账所代理”模式。本文运用演化博弈论原理,对社会中介参与村级会计委托代理的可行性、优势及其运行模式做出分析,提出“村账所代理”即由社会中介(如会计师事务所)代理村级会计更符合我国农村财务管理的现实和趋势。

CLC Number: