Abstract: This article make an empirical study on the relationship between Chinese domestic capital flow, government regulation and the improvement of local output efficiency. It shows that the domestic capital flow can improve the output efficiency of areas involved, but this effect only reflect in the long-term. The policy decision focusing on short-term gains and costs, which constrained by Chinese fiscal decentralization and the promotion-tournament, become the local governments’ behavioral logic on protectionism regulation. The intervention aims to promote the free flow of capital can gradually increase the marginal output efficiency improvement of capital flow. However, the protectionism-regulation can reduce the marginal output efficiency improvement of capital flow to some extent.

摘要： 本文对国内资本流动、地方政府对资本流动的管制及其属地总体产出效率改善间的关系进行了经验研究。研究发现：国内实体资本的充分流动能够提高所涉及地区的总体产出效率，但此效应只在长期得以体现。财政分权与“晋升锦标赛”制度安排下的短期收益-成本决策成为地方政府管制资本流动的行为逻辑。地方政府旨在促进属地资本自由流动的顺市场力量干预能够逐渐提升资本流动的边际产出效率改善；地方政府逆市场力量管制资本自由流动则在一定程度上降低了属地资本流动的边际产出效率改善。