›› 2014, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (6): 46-52.

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State Ownership, Government Pricing Regulations and Long-Run IPO Performance

  

  • Received:2013-09-23 Revised:2013-12-27 Online:2014-06-10 Published:2014-05-23

国有股权、政府定价管制与IPO长期收益率

王成方1,叶若慧2   

  1. 1. 浙江财经大学会计学院
    2. 中国人民大学商学院
  • 通讯作者: 王成方
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目;教育部人文社科基金项目

Abstract: Few studies focus on the relationship between state ownership and long-run IPO performance, and government regulations haven’t been taken into account. This paper selected the data of A-share IPO companies from 1990 to 30 June 2011 as sample, examined the effects of state ownership on long-run IPO performance and government pricing regulations on the relationship between state ownership and long-run IPO performance. Cluster regression results show that long-run IPO performance decreased with state ownership, and long-run IPO performance decreased with state ownership in the government pricing regulations firms. This paper deepens the research about the effects of state ownership on long-run IPO performance, helps to know more about government behavior and its influence in process of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and helps to understand the relationship between government, enterprise and market in process of the development of the Chinese securities market.

摘要: 目前很少有研究关注国有股权与IPO长期收益率之间的关系,并且他们没有考虑政府定价管制程度对国有股权与IPO长期收益率之间关系的影响问题。本文选择1990至2011年6月30日的中国A股IPO公司为研究样本,研究了国有股权对IPO长期收益率的影响,并进一步探讨政府定价管制程度对国有股权与IPO长期收益率之间关系的影响。Cluster回归结果表明,国有股权比例越高,IPO长期收益率越低;相对于政府定价管制程度较低公司来说,国有股权降低了政府定价管制程度较高公司的IPO长期收益率。本文深化了国有股权对IPO长期收益率的影响方面的研究,有助于认识国有企业私有化过程中的政府行为及其影响,有助于理解证券市场发展过程中政府、企业与市场之间的关系。

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