Abstract: Based on the date of a share market in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011, this paper mainly examines the affection of the government intervention on the firm dividend policy. The results of our examination show that: the more the degree of the government intervention, the less probability of board implements dividend policy and the lower the pay cash dividend for shareholders. Furthermore, the degree of the government intervention will be reduced in the companies which have more marketing and technological resource, and there are higher probability of board implements dividend policy and the more the pay cash dividend for shareholders in those companies. The findings above not only verify the theory of the affection of the government intervention on the firm dividend policy and enrich the relevant research, but also provide beneficial implications for relevant policies in practice.

摘要： 基于2009-2011年沪深A股上市公司数据，考察了政府干预对上市公司股利政策的影响。研究结果发现：政府对上市公司的干预程度越高，公司向股东发放股利的可能性越小，股利支付率越低；进一步的研究发现，在市场资源和技术资源较丰富的公司中，政府干预程度将减弱，公司更可能向股东发放较高程度的股利。这一结论验证了政府干预影响公司股利决策的理论，从实践上为中国上市公司制定合理的股利支付决策提供启示。