Abstract: Based on the cases of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2012 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, this empirical Study studied the impacts of trade credit on inefficient investment. The major findings in this study include: Overinvestment behavior of listed companies is mainly because that agency conflict is more serious and the companies raise a lot of free cash flow; and underinvestment is primarily due to financing constraints, rather than the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors; Listed companies’ trade credit in general can inhabit overinvestment and give play to the role of governance. Meantime, trade credit can alleviate underinvestment in listed companies and plays a role of financing.

摘要： 基于2003-2012年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验商业信用对非效率投资的影响。研究发现：上市公司的过度投资行为主要是由代理冲突比较严重且公司存在大量自由现金流而引发，投资不足主要是由融资约束引发，并非由债权代理冲突引发；上市公司的商业信用能够抑制过度投资，发挥治理作用。同时，商业信用又能够缓解投资不足，发挥融资功能。