激励规制、市场势力与接入定价——以电信业为例

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (3): 103-112.

• 政府管制 • 上一篇

激励规制、市场势力与接入定价——以电信业为例

房林, 邹卫星

天津财经大学经济学院,天津 300222

收稿日期:2016-03-23 出版日期:2017-03-10 发布日期:2017-03-10
作者简介:房林(1979-),女,辽宁大连人,天津财经大学经济学院讲师,博士; 邹卫星(1970-),男,湖北监利人,天津财经大学经济学院副教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目(16BJL031)

Incentive Regulation, Market Power and Access Pricing——Taking Telecommunication Industry as an Example

FANG Lin, ZOU Weixing

School of Economics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China

Received:2016-03-23 Online:2017-03-10 Published:2017-03-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 政府规制的目标是矫正市场失灵,不当的规制方案会限制市场竞争活力,阻碍技术创新。本文将规制机构、厂商和消费者纳入到激励相容框架下,通过考察信息约束条件下的接入定价问题,解释了产品的需求价格弹性、政府转移支付、税收政策、技术创新和网络外部性与接入定价的关系,引申出主导性厂商市场势力的来源及激励性接入定价政策,得出电信监管部门实施对网间结算费的直接规制,没有减弱市场势力,反而抑制了主导性厂商提高接入质量和研发创新。

关键词: 网络产业, 激励规制, 市场势力, 接入定价

Abstract: The purpose of government regulation is to correct market failure, and improper regulation methods will reduce market efficiency and impede technology innovation, which will lead to regulation failure. This paper introduces regulatory authority, manufacturers and consumers into the incentive compatibility research framework, studies access pricing under informational constraints, and analyzes the influence on access pricing of various factors, such as demand price elasticity, government transfer payment, tax policy, technology innovation and internet externalities. It also does research on the source of dominating manufacturers' market power and incentive policy access pricing. It's found that the direct regulation plan of inter-network settlement payment does not lessen the market power; on the contrary, it has a restraining effect on the dominating manufacturers' efforts to improve the access quality and increase the R ＆ D investment.

Key words: Network Industries, Incentive Regulation, Market Power, Access Pricing

中图分类号:

F270.3
F421

房林, 邹卫星. 激励规制、市场势力与接入定价——以电信业为例[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(3): 103-112.

FANG Lin, ZOU Weixing. Incentive Regulation, Market Power and Access Pricing——Taking Telecommunication Industry as an Example[J]. , 2017, 33(3): 103-112.

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激励规制、市场势力与接入定价——以电信业为例

Incentive Regulation, Market Power and Access Pricing——Taking Telecommunication Industry as an Example

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