企业投融资互动机制下的信贷违约风险——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 48-59.

企业投融资互动机制下的信贷违约风险——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

彭程¹,刘怡²,代彬¹

1. 四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心,重庆 400031;
2. 四川外国语大学审计处,重庆 400031

收稿日期:2017-09-04 出版日期:2018-07-10 发布日期:2018-07-02
作者简介:彭程(1978-),男,湖南娄底人,四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心教授,博士;刘怡(1979-),女,湖南怀化人,四川外国语大学审计处会计师,通讯作者;代彬(1982-),男,重庆市人,四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心副教授,博士。
基金资助:
重庆市第五届优秀人才支持计划

Impacts of Interactions Between Investment and Debt Financing on Credit Default Risk——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

PENG Cheng¹,LIU Yi², DAI Bin¹

1. Center for International Business and Economy, Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing 400031, China;
2. Audit Division, Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing 400031, China

Received:2017-09-04 Online:2018-07-10 Published:2018-07-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以中国上市公司为样本,实证分析了在负债融资与投资决策相互作用的机制下企业信贷违约风险的变化规律。实证结果表明,整体上投资支出会促进信贷违约风险,负债融资会对其产生抑制;在负债融资导致的过度投资情形下,企业投资对信贷违约风险的促进作用将更明显,而过度投资会抑制企业最优负债融资水平,从而带来更低的最优信贷违约风险;短期负债融资会促进企业信贷违约风险的增加。文章为信贷违约风险控制探寻了一种从企业微观财务决策角度进行分析的全新视角。

关键词: 投资支出, 负债融资, 互动关系, 信贷违约风险

Abstract: This paper empirically studies the impacts of interactions between investment and debt financing decisions on credit default risk. The results show that the investment expenditure increases credit default risk while the debt financing decreases it. Because of overinvestment problems stemming from the debt financing, the investment would exert stronger positive influences on credit default risk, and overinvestment problems would in turn decrease the optimal debt level, resulting in the optimal credit default risk. Short-term debt financing would increase the credit default risk. The study provides a new perspective to manage the credit default risk from the anle of firms‘micro-financial decisions

Key words: Investment Expenditure, Debt Financing, Interactions, Credit Default Risk

中图分类号:

F230

彭程,刘怡,代彬. 企业投融资互动机制下的信贷违约风险——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(7): 48-59.

PENG Cheng,LIU Yi, DAI Bin. Impacts of Interactions Between Investment and Debt Financing on Credit Default Risk——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms[J]. , 2018, 34(7): 48-59.

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