分析师跟踪与资本结构动态调整

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 60-69.

分析师跟踪与资本结构动态调整

凌鸿程

中国社会科学院研究生院,北京 102488

收稿日期:2017-12-05 出版日期:2018-07-10 发布日期:2018-07-02
作者简介:凌鸿程(1990-),男,江西赣州人,中国社会科学院研究生院博士生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71463019)

Analysts‘Coverage and Dynamic Adjustment of Enterprise Capital Structure

LING Hongcheng

Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China

Received:2017-12-05 Online:2018-07-10 Published:2018-07-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文使用2005～2015年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证考察了分析师跟踪与企业资本结构调整的内在联系。结果表明,分析师跟踪促进了企业资本结构调整,这种促进作用的主要机制是通过缓解资本市场信息不对称,降低资本结构调整成本,因此对信息透明度较高的企业样本组,其促进作用不明显。区分不同负债水平和不同所有制企业后,其促进作用也存在差异。进一步的研究还发现,分析师跟踪主要通过企业增加或减少债务的途径影响企业资本结构调整。

关键词: 分析师跟踪, 资本结构调整, 信息不对称, 调整成本

Abstract: Using data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2015, this paper investigates if analysts‘coverage can speed up corporate capital structure adjustment. We find that analysts‘coverage promotes the dynamic adjustment.The mechanism of this promotion is to alleviate the information asymmetry and reduces the dynamic adjustment costs. Therefore, the promotion effect on enterprises with higher information transparency is relatively inconspicuous. When it comes to different debt ratios and different ownership, the promotion effect is also different. Further studies have also found that analysts‘coverage speeds up capital structure adjustment mainly through increasing or decreasing enterprises‘debt.

Key words: Analysts' Coverage, Capital Structure Adjustment, Information Asymmetry, Adjustment Costs

中图分类号:

F062.5
F275

凌鸿程. 分析师跟踪与资本结构动态调整[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(7): 60-69.

LING Hongcheng. Analysts‘Coverage and Dynamic Adjustment of Enterprise Capital Structure[J]. , 2018, 34(7): 60-69.

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