机构投资者持股能提高会计信息可比性吗？

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 65-74.

机构投资者持股能提高会计信息可比性吗？

孙光国¹, 杨金凤^1,2

1.东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连 116025
2.山东工商学院会计学院,山东烟台 264005

收稿日期:2016-11-15 出版日期:2017-08-10 发布日期:2017-08-10
作者简介:孙光国(1971),男,四川宣汉人,东北财经大学会计学院教授,中国内部控制研究中如教授;杨金凤( 1988),女,黑龙江伊春人,东北财经大学会计学院博士生,山东工商学院会计学院讲师。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272051);山东省社科规划基金资助项目(15CGLJ22);山东工商学院青年科研基金资助项目(2015QN010)

Can Institutional Ownership Improve Accounting Comparability of Listed Companies?

SUN Guangguo¹, YANG Jinfeng^1,2

1.School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
2. School of Accounting,Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005, China

Received:2016-11-15 Online:2017-08-10 Published:2017-08-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文针对机构投资者如何影响会计信息可比性以及产生影响的渠道和路径展开研究。研究发现:首先,机构投资者持股能够提升会计信息可比性,对投资者保护有积极作用。其次,将机构投资者细分为交易型机构投资者和稳定型机构投资者,前者对会计信息可比性有显著影响,而后者的影响并不显著,表明机构投资者主要通过发挥信息中介效应影响可比性。最后,在控制盈余管理的因素后,机构投资者持股仍对会计信息可比性有直接影响。

关键词: 机构投资者, 会计信息可比性, 投资者保护

Abstract: This paper investigates how the institutional ownership affects accounting comparability and further explores the specific channel and path. Firstly, the paper finds that institutional ownership could improve accounting comparability and has a positive effect on investor's protection. Secondly, after dividing institutional investors into trading institutional investors and stable institutional investors, the paper finds that the former has a significant impact on accounting comparability, whereas the latter has no significant impact, which indicates that accounting comparability is mainly influenced by institutional investors through information intermediary effect. Finally, after controlling earning management factors, the paper discovers that the institutional ownership still has direct influence on comparability.

Key words: Institutional Ownership, Accounting Comparability, Investor Protection

中图分类号:

F234.4

孙光国, 杨金凤. 机构投资者持股能提高会计信息可比性吗？[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(8): 65-74.

SUN Guangguo, YANG Jinfeng. Can Institutional Ownership Improve Accounting Comparability of Listed Companies?[J]. , 2017, 33(8): 65-74.

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