签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 58-67.

签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

张龙平¹, 潘临²

中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉 430073;

收稿日期:2017-07-15 出版日期:2018-03-10 发布日期:2018-03-10
作者简介:张龙平(1966-),男,重庆垫江人,中南财经政法大学会计学院教授,博士生导师;潘临(1991-),男,福建莆田人,中南财经政法大学会计学院博士生。
基金资助:
国家社科重大项目(11&ZD044)

Auditor Partner Busyness and Audit Quality——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

ZHANG Longping¹, PAN Lin²

School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China;

Received:2017-07-15 Online:2018-03-10 Published:2018-03-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以我国2007~2014年的上市公司为样本,实证研究签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的影响。结果显示,在其他条件相同的情况下,签字会计师繁忙度越高,审计质量越低,支持了“压力效应”。进一步研究发现,在发生两名签字会计师轮换的样本中,由于继任签字会计师缺乏客户层面的审计经验,签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的消极影响更加显著;其次,在大客户中,签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的消极影响被显著削弱,表明繁忙的签字会计师会对大客户保持更多的关注度和职业谨慎,并投入更多时间和精力,从而保障更高的审计质量。最后,区分了签字会计师角色后,发现只有复核签字会计师繁忙才会导致审计质量下降,而项目签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量无关。

关键词: 签字会计师繁忙度, 审计质量, 签字会计师轮换, 客户规模

Abstract:

This paper studies the impact of auditor partner busyness on audit quality using the listed companies in China from 2007 to 2014 as samples.It is found that the relationship between auditor partner busyness and audit quality is significantly negative, which supports the “pressure effect”. Further research finds that in the case of two signature auditors rotation, the negative impact of the auditor partner busyness on audit quality is more significant due to the lack of audit experience at the customer level. In the case of big customers, the negative impact is significantly weakened, indicating that auditors will allocate more time to bigger customers with more attention and practice caution. Finally, after distinguishing the review auditor and the field auditor, we find that only the review auditor partner busyness will result in the decline of the audit quality, while the field auditor partner busyness has nothing to do with the audit quality.

Key words: Auditor Partner Busyness, Audit Quality, Auditor Partner Rotation, Customer Size

中图分类号:

F239

张龙平, 潘临. 签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(3): 58-67.

ZHANG Longping, PAN Lin. Auditor Partner Busyness and Audit Quality——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies[J]. , 2018, 34(3): 58-67.

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